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Abstract
It was the goal of the current study to investigate
one debiasing technique and its ability to reduce
judgmental errors.

In addition, a rival hypothesis of

demand characteristics was examined as a possible
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental
errors.

Participants were randomly assigned to either a

control group or a debiasing group and asked to rate the
likelihood of several hypothetical events i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X
2 (Gender X Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated
Measure) repeated measures experimental design.

Level of

anxiety responsiveness was measured to arrange subjects
into a "normal" and a highly anxious group.

It was

hypothesized that highly anxious participants would report
higher probability estimates of future threat-related
events relative to participants with a "normal" level of
anxiety responsiveness, a main effect for anxiety.
Secondly, it was hypothesized that a two-way interaction of
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat
probability ratings would be found.

Third, it was

hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and
anxiety upon threat probability ratings would be found.
Finally, it was hypothesized that there would be no main
effects or interaction effects involving the repeated
iv
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measure and the experimental demand independent variable.
A mixed factorial design 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted using the threat probability ratings as
the dependent variable.

In addition, two separate analyses

were conducted using the experimental demand stimuli as the
dependent variable to investigate demand characteristics as
an explanation of the debiasing.

The results showed that

the debiasing procedure was effective in the reduction of
judgmental errors.

In addition, it was found that demand

characteristics could not account for the reduction in
pessimistic threat-related predictions.

The results were

discussed in terms of cognitive biases and implications for
cognitive behavior therapy.

v
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Introduction
The judgement of the likelihood of future events
involves many processes other than the mental mathematical
estimation of probabilities.

Judgmental processes appear

to involve the use of mental shortcuts, or heuristics.
Heuristics function to aid in the estimation of the
likelihood of future events in order to reduce the
complexity of the estimation.

As a result, errors in

judgement can occur due to the reliance on these heuristics
that reduce the need for complex calculations in favor of
easily estimated judgements that are, at times, inaccurate.
One area of judgmental error that has received recent
attention is the pessimistic prediction of future threatrelated events associated with high levels of anxiety.
Pessimistic errors in the estimation of the likelihood of
future events have been found in anxious individuals

(Bentz

& Williamson, 1998; Bentz, Williamson, & Smith, 1999).
Most investigators have postulated that a process of
increased availability of threat-related information leads
to this judgmental bias
Richards, Dziadosz,

(Bentz & Williamson,

1998; Harvey,

& Swindell, 1993).

Research on the reduction of judgmental errors has
attempted use techniques which increase the availability of
alternative information
Wilson, 1995).

(Hirt & Markman,

1995; Mumma &

However, the results are mixed in findings
1
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of debiasing techniques that have attempted to reduce
judgmental biases
1995) .

(Sharpe & Adair, 1993; Weinstein & Klien,

In addition, no previous studies have specifically-

investigated the reduction of a pessimistic judgment bias
associated with higher levels of anxiety.
It was the goal of this study to investigate one
debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative procedure
(Hirt & Markman,

1995), and its ability to reduce the

judgmental errors which have been shown to be associated
with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998).
In addition, the rival hypothesis of demand characteristics
was investigated as a possible explanation of any findings
of a reduction in judgmental errors.
Cognitive Biases in Anxiety
Cognitive biases have been postulated to be an
important component in the development and maintenance of
anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997; Bower, 1981; Lang, 1985;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) .

In addition, cognitive biases

are important in our understanding of the mechanisms of
debiasing.

The current study will specifically address the

debiasing of one type of cognitive bias, namely judgmental
errors associated with anxiety.
Research on attentional biases, memory biases, and
more recently, judgmental biases form the scientific basis
for the understanding of how anxious persons develop
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organized memory from the systematic selection of threatrelated information.
below.

Each of these topics is discussed

In addition, a conceptualization of cognitive

biases is also reviewed, with an emphasis on cognitive
models of anxiety.
Attentional Bias

The attentional bias research has

found that anxious persons allocate more attentional
resources to threat-related stimuli.

This research has

established that anxiety is associated with the biased
allocation of attention toward threat-related information.
More recently, the study of attentional biases has moved
toward the investigation of the processes of attention and
their relation to the development and maintenance of
anxiety disorders.
Studies that have investigated the relation between
emotion and attention have generally used variations of
three different paradigms: Stroop color-naming tasks,
visual attention tasks, and dichotic listening tasks
(MacLeod & Mathews, 1991).

In the Stroop color-naming

task, words are presented in different colors of ink.

It

is the task of the participant to name the color of the ink
while ignoring the content of the word.

Attention to the

word meaning versus the color of ink is measured by the
slowing of reaction times in naming of the color of ink.
When investigating emotional states, the content of the
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words presented are mood congruent, e.g. threat-related
words for studying anxiety disorders.
Using the Stroop color-naming task, several studies
have shown that anxious participants are significantly
slower at naming the color of ink when the word content is
threat-related in comparison to non-threat related words
(Foa, Feske, McCarthy, Murdock, & Kozak,
MacLeod,

1985; McNally, Kaspi, Rienmann,

19 91; Mathews &
& Zeitlin, 1990).

In general, these studies have found that the color naming
of threat-related words was slower due to the bias that
exists in the selective allocation of attentional resources
toward the threat-related information.

For example,

Mathews and MacLeod (1985) showed that anxious
participants' reaction times in color naming are slower for
threat words in comparison to non-threat words.
However, the Stroop paradigm had received some
criticism.

Specifically, it had been suggested that the

Stroop paradigm may not provide an accurate measure of
attention bias

(Mineka & Sutton, 1992) due to the

automaticity of reading.

Specifically, it has been

proposed that Stroop effects may be due to the ease with
which words may be read and not due to an attentional bias
(Kahneman & Chajczyk,

1983).

The visual attention and

dichotic listening tasks were developed in response to
these criticisms.
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Visual attention tasks involve the presentation of a
variety of words on a computer screen, occasionally
followed by a dot probe in the place of one of the words.
The dot probe is simply a stimulus that cues the
participant to respond.

It is the task of the participant

to respond to the probe as quickly as possible by simply
pressing a key.

Attention to the content of the presented

words is obtained by measuring reaction times to the visual
dot probe.

Faster reaction times to the probe following a

threat-related stimulus indicated increased attention to
that stimulus.

Similar to the Stroop paradigm, the visual

attention studies have, in general, shown that anxiety is
associated with a biased selective allocation of
attentional resources toward threat (Logan & Goetsch, 1993;
MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986).
Dichotic listening tasks involve the presentation of
messages to the participant in each ear with the use of
headphones.

It is the responsibility of the participant to

shadow, or attend to only one of the messages.

A measure

of attention is then obtained from the participants' recall
of the content of the shadowed message.

Similar to the two

previous paradigms, the findings of the dichotic listening
experiments have demonstrated selective attention toward
threat in anxious groups

(Logan & Geotsch, 1993; Mathews &
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MacLeod, 198 6) as indicated by increased recall of the
threat information.
Thus, the research on an attentional bias in anxiety
has documented a clear relation between anxious states and
the biased allocation of attentional resources toward
threat-related information.

Recent studies have begun to

investigate the processes of the attentional bias and its
relation to the development and maintenance of anxiety
disorders.

For example, Kindt and Brosschot

(1997) showed

that there was no difference in the threat-related
attentional bias for pictures and words.
Kindt and Brosschot

In addition,

(1998) also demonstrated that the

attentional bias for threat in anxiety is stable over time
and responsive to experimental manipulation.

McNally,

Hornig, Hoffman, and Han (1999) suggested that the
emergence of an attentional bias occurs after the
development of clinical levels of anxiety.
In summary, the literature has shown a biased
allocation of attentional resources toward threat-related
information.

Specifically, the attentional bias appears to

be a stable phenomena responsive to experimental
manipulation that may emerge after the development of
clinical levels of anxiety.
Memory Bias

In general, a memory bias in anxiety

deals with the selective encoding, elaboration, and
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retrieval of threat—related information.

A memory bias for

threat-related words has been demonstrated in posttraumatic stress disorder

(Zeitlin & McNally, 1991), panic

disorder (Cloitre & Lebowitz,

1991; McNally, Foa, &

Donnell, 1989), and anxiety states
Eysenck, 198 9).

(Mathews, Mogg, May, &

In general, these studies have shown that

anxious individuals have an enhanced recall of threatrelated words in comparison to control groups.
However, not all investigations of memory bias in
anxiety have produced supportive findings.
Mineka

Nugent and

(1994) failed to find an implicit memory bias in

students with a high level of trait anxiety.

In addition,

in their review of cognitive biases in emotional disorders,
Mineka and Sutton (1992) concluded that the status of a
memory bias for threat-related information in anxious
participants is unclear due to conflicting findings.

This

conclusion is in contrast to the overall findings for a
memory bias for negative information in depression.
Three possible explanations for the conflicting
findings in the area of memory bias in anxiety have been
postulated.

First, it is possible that a memory bias is

most prominent with depression

(Mineka & Sutton,

1992) and

the mixed findings are due to the overlap of depression and
anxiety.

Second, some negative findings may be due to the

content of the stimuli presented in the studies that have
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failed to show a memory bias.

For example, it is possible

that the stimuli used by Nugent and Mineka

(1994) did not

assess the correct content of threat to detect a memory
bias, resulting in the null finding for implicit memory.
Finally, Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) recently
suggested that the inconsistent findings in the memory bias
research may be due to the way in which the threatening
information is encoded.

Specifically, they proposed that

with anxiety, the primary cognitive activities are nonconscious and exaggerated forms of evolutionary mechanisms.
Therefore, this basic system which functions to simply
evaluate threat would be unlikely to result in an encoding
of threat information in the form of semantic memory.
Rather, it is more likely that threat information would be
encoded as perceptual representations.

Due to this

possible encoding method, most memory tests may have been
insensitive to the detection of a memory bias associated
with anxiety.

To date, this specific controversy has not

been addressed in the literature.
In summary, the literature pertaining to a memory bias
in anxiety has produced a set of findings that are
inconsistent.

This inconsistency may be due to the ways in

which the study of a memory bias in anxiety is conducted.
However, the majority of the empirical evidence supports
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the conclusion of a memory bias for threat-related
information associated with anxiety.
Judgmental Bias

The judgmental biases associated with

anxiety have received less attention than attentional and
memory biases.

As a result, the available literature is

limited, but it is relevant to the current study.
Judgmental biases can be defined as any selective
processing of emotional information (Mineka & Sutton, 1992)
that results in systematically biased inferences.
Butler and Mathews

(1983) presented one of the first

articles in the area of judgmental biases in emotional
disorders. Anxious, depressed, and control participants
were presented a variety of ambiguous situations.

The

participants then responded to the brief situations with
their perceived most likely outcome, one of which was
judged to be threat-related during the pilot phase of the
study.

Both anxious and depressed groups were found to

overestimate the risk of future negative outcomes in
comparison to the control group.

No difference between the

two clinical groups was shown in their judgment of future
events.

The results were interpreted as supporting the

association between anxiety and depression with the
availability of threat-related information.
Anderson, Spielman, and Bargh (1992) extended the
research of Butler and Mathews

(198 3) to include not only
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inferences of ambiguous situations but also judgments of
future events.

Control and depressed participants were

asked to predict both positive and negative events in a
reaction time task in which subjects were timed in their
responses.

It was hypothesized that the highly depressed

participants would predict more negative events and show
faster reaction times in their predictions.

As expected,

the highly depressed participants predicted more negative
events, fewer positive events, and showed greater
automaticity (faster reaction times) in their predictions,
in comparison to the control and low depression groups.
The results, although not directly applicable to anxiety
states, provide support for the proposition that emotional
states are associated with negatively biased judgments of
future events.
MacLeod and Byrne

(1996) also investigated the

prediction of future events in depressed and anxious
participants.

Groups of anxious, anxious-depressed,, and

control participants were asked to generate future positive
and negative experiences over three time periods.

The time

periods for the prediction of future experiences included
within the next week, the next year, and the next five to
ten years.

The number of experiences generated by the

participants was recorded as the measure of positive and
negative judgments.

It was found that the anxious group

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

anticipated significantly more negative experiences, when
compared to the control group.

Furthermore, the anxious-

depressed group showed both the anticipation of more
negative experiences and less positive experiences.

The

results were interpreted to suggest that anxiety is
characterized by increases in negative thinking and that
depression is characterized by both increased negative and
decreased positive thinking.
Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and Swindell

(1993)

studied the misinterpretation of ambiguous stimuli in three
groups including panic disorder, social phobia, and control
participants.

Internal and external situations were

presented and the participants made judgments as to their
explanation of cause.

Relative to the control group, both

anxious groups interpreted more internal and external
situations as threatening.

In addition, the panic disorder

participants were found to choose a threat-related
explanation for interoceptive (internal)
than the social phobics.

stimuli more often

Activation of threat-related

memory schemas was offered by the authors to explain the
judgment bias.

This conceptualization supports the notion

that activation of threat-related memory is related to
pessimistic predictions of future events.
Of the studies in the area of judgmental biases
reviewed thus far, it is of note that only Butler and
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Mathews

(1983) used stimuli that were threat-related.

In a

study of judgmental errors in anxiety, Bentz and Williamson
(1998) used trait anxiety, perceived personal control, and
gender as predictor variables for ratings of the
probability of future threatening events.

Participants

were presented a variety of ambiguous situations and asked
to predict the probability of specific threatening
outcomes.

The results indicated an interaction of anxiety

and gender upon probability judgments of future threatening
events.

Specifically, highly anxious female participants

were found to respond with the most pessimistic judgments
of future events, but not highly anxious males.
Bentz, Williamson, and Smith (1999) tested the content
specificity of a judgmental bias associated with different
levels of anxiety and dietary restraint.

Participants were

administered threat-related and overeating-related stimuli
and asked to predict several future negative events.

The

results showed that both trait anxiety and dietary
restraint were associated with the prediction of future
negative events.

In addition, each of the personality

traits was found to be associated with the congruent
content of the prediction stimuli.

Stated simply, anxiety

was found to be associated with the prediction of threat
while dietary restraint was found to be related to the
prediction of overeating.

Finally, an interaction of
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gender and anxiety was found replicating the results of
Bentz and Williamson (1998).

These results suggest that a

judgmental bias for future negative events may be a
function of the specific events that are to be predicted,
and not a general bias across different disorders.
In summary, several conclusions can be made from the
reviewed literature pertaining to a judgmental bias in
anxiety.

First, anxiety appears to be associated with

threat-related judgmental errors.

Second, the judgmental

bias in anxiety may be associated with the specific content
of the events that are to be judged.
Conceptualization

Given these empirical findings

pertaining to cognitive biases, it is possible to draw a
logical conceptualization of the biases associated with
anxiety.

Situational anxiety can be produced by adverse

life events and stress.

Individuals with higher levels of

anxiety have been shown to be more likely to attend to,
encode, and recall threat-related information.

In

addition, it has more recently been shown that anxious
individuals are also more likely to judge future events as
more threatening.
Thus, for anxious individuals threat-related
information is more available in memory than non-threat
information which may result in the judgment of future
events that are similarly threat-related.

Therefore, a
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lower threshold for the recollection of threatening
information, greater availability of this information, and
more probable predictions of future threat may be a factor
in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders.
Several cognitive models of psychopathology have used
parts of this conceptualization of cognitive biases in the
formulation of their models.

For example, Lang

(1985) and

Bower (1981) both proposed network models of emotion in
which threat stimuli and information may be encoded into
organized systems that are easily accessed and serve to
activate fear.

Although not specifically addressed by Lang

(1985) or Bower

(1981), activation of the "fear networks"

would then serve to increase the availability of this
information leading to threat-related judgments of future
events.
More recently, Mathews and Mackintosh

(19 98) proposed

the only cognitive model of anxiety that addresses not only
attentional and memory biases, but also a judgmental bias.
Specifically, the model proposes a "threat evaluation
system" (TES) which serves as a decision making mechanism
to evaluate threat.

Input from the TES is increased with

higher levels of anxiety.

The model also recognizes

voluntary effort on the part of the individual as a second
factor for input into demand on cognitive processes.
Therefore, biases arise from the opposing influences of the
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TES and voluntary effort to result in systematic processing
of emotional information, including the processing that
results in judgmental errors.
Finally, Beck and Clark (1997) proposed a schema-based
cognitive model as an extension of an earlier information
processing theory (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).

Three

stages of processing are proposed to result in the
cognitive, affective, and behavioral pattern of anxiety.
In stage I, automatic recognition of information occurs and
assigns processing priority to threat stimuli.

Then, in

stage II, activation of primitive schemas aimed at survival
occurs and results in constricted processing of threat to
give rise to cognitive biases.

Finally in stage III, full

activation of schemas occurs and a secondary appraisal of
the information results in (1) further escalation of
anxiety,

(2) reappraisal leading to decreased anxiety, or

(3) avoidance and escape.
With the exception of the model proposed by Mathews
and Mackintosh (1998), none of the cognitive models
reviewed have specifically addressed judgmental biases as a
factor in the development and maintenance of anxiety.

This

may be due to the relative recent emergence of this area of
cognitive bias research.

As will be addressed in the next

sections, a judgmental bias fits well into these cognitive
models due to the availability of threat related
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information for consideration when individuals make
probability judgments.
Probability Forecasting
It is important to the present discussion to review
some of the processes involved in inferring the outcomes of
future events.

First, an understanding of how individuals

infer future outcomes will aid in the explanation of how
the reduction of judgmental errors may occur.

Second, in

the case of anxiety, the availability of causes or reasons
for an event may be related to the estimation of future
outcomes and subsequently the reduction of errors in
estimation.
As an example of research on probability forecasting,
Hoch (1985) asked graduate students to predict future job
offers, salary, and date of employment.

In addition,

participants generated reasons for why the job offers might
and might not occur.

The predictions of the participants

were compared to actual outcomes obtained from the school's
job placement center.

The results indicated that accuracy

of predictions increased when the participants generated
reasons for negative outcomes.

Further, the generation of

reasons for positive outcomes resulted in lower accuracy of
predictions in the direction of optimistic estimates of
future job offers and salary.
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Weinstein (198 0) and Wright and Ayton (1992) also
investigated the predictions of future events in a sample
of students.

Both studies again showed a general tendency

for optimistic probability forecasting.

In addition,

it

was suggested that forecasting may depend on the
desirability of the situation (Wright & Ayton,

1992), but

in general, estimation occurs based on the information that
is available at the time of the prediction.
There are several conclusions that can be derived from
the probability forecasting literature.

First, the amount

of information available at the time of prediction is
central to the accuracy of the forecasting, with positive
information often leading to inaccurate predictions in the
positive direction.

Second, there appears to be a general

tendency for participants to predict positive outcomes, a
general optimistic forecasting.

Finally, the accuracy of

forecasting tends to decrease as the situation becomes more
personal and there is less information available.
A common factor in the probability forecasting
literature reviewed thus far is the investigation of
prediction of future events in samples of novice
participants.

Probability forecasting in samples of expert

participants has also been studied.

The estimation of the

probability of future events in a sample of experts may be
different from forecasting by novices.
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Wright, Rowe, Bolger, and Gairanack (1994) outlined
several possible ways in which experts may be superior to
novices at forecasting future events.

First, experts may

be better calibrated in a specific domain, but equally
inconsistent with respect to the laws of probability.
Second, expertise may be achieved through simple training
in the laws of probability,

and therefore more consistent

with the laws of probability.

Third and finally, experts

may be equally poor to non-experts in their calibration in
a specific domain, but for reasons other than knowledge of
the laws of probability they are better at prediction.
Stated simply, experts may be better at forecasting in
their specific task, they may be more knowledgeable in
probability laws, or they may be better at forecasting for
some other unidentified reason.
In fact, the quality of judgments made by experts has
been shown to be superior to judgments of novices.
and Brown

Murphy

(1985) found that weather forecasters produce

superior predictions of rain.
Kanetkar, Vertinsky, and Wilson

In addition, Vertinsky,
(198 6) showed that hockey

players can provide high quality probability estimates of
the results of their future games.

However, identification

of the precise factors which result in optimal judgment
remains to be established in future research.

Thus,

probability forecasting in experts may be more accurate
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than in non-experts.

However, the precise factors involved

in the accuracy of judgments remains to be investigated.
Cognitive Heuristics
The ways in which individuals make judgments of
frequency, chance, and group membership is often explained
by the operation of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that
simplify the judgment and decision process.

Kahneman and

Tversky (1972, 1982) have described a number of heuristics
that are commonly used in human judgment.

These include

the representativeness, availability, and the anchoring and
adjustment heuristics.

The three heuristics are reviewed

given their relevance to the judgmental processes in
predicting future events.
The representativeness heuristic refers to a decision
making process in which a person makes judgments based on a
comparison to a prototypical example of a similar event.
For example, when judging the likelihood of an event, a
person may compare the situation to a typical event with
similar circumstances.

This heuristic has been shown to be

frequently used in judgments and decisions of everyday life
(Tversky & Kahneman,

1982) and in clinical judgments (Garb,

1996).
The availability heuristic refers to a decision making
process in which the person makes judgments based on the
ease with which they can recall or cognitively construct
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relevant instances.

For example, the ease with which an

individual can recall events will result in a higher
probability estimate, when the individual is asked to judge
the frequency of a similar events occurrence.
Lepper, and Ross

Anderson,

(198 0) identified two variables that

mediate availability judgments:

(1) imagery of the event

and (2) perceived reasons or causes of the event.

It is

proposed that the first occurs in novel situations for
which there are few similar events encoded in memory from
experience and the second occurs in other instances of
availability judgments.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to a
decision making process in which people make estimates by
considering an initial value that they then adjust to yield
the final estimate.

For example, when asked to judge the

distance of an object, a person often will use a known
anchor then adjust their judgment accordingly.

Anchoring

biases have been shown to robustly influence judgments
concerning external information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974),
but they may have less of an impact on self-related
judgments.
The most recent advancements in the area of heuristics
research has focused on the use of these heuristics in
various situations.

Agnoli and Krantz

(1989)

suggested a

"competing heuristic model" in which the process by which a
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heuristic is selected for use is determined by a
competition between the heuristics.

In addition, it was

suggested that some heuristics are "natural," while others
are acquired through learning or experience.
Czaczkes and Ganzach

(1996) studied the processes by

which heuristics compete and become dominant.

In a series

of several experiments, the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic was compared to the. representativeness heuristic.
It was found that factors of the situation mediated which
judgment heuristic was used.

Specifically, saliency of a

potential anchor increased the reliance on the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic.

However, compatibility between

the predictor and potential outcome increased the reliance
on the representativeness heuristic.

Overall, these

results support the "competing heuristic model" as proposed
by Agnoli and Krantz
Garb

(198 9).

(1996) studied the representativeness versus the

past-behavior heuristics in clinical judgments.

In a

series of three experiments, clinicians made diagnostic
judgments from case history information.

Similar to

Czaczkes and Ganzach (1996), factors of the situation were
found to determine which heuristic was used when making
judgments.

The representativeness heuristic was used by

the clinicians when making judgments of diagnosis.
However, when judgments involved predictions about the
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patients' future behavior, it was found that the clinicians
used the past-behavior heuristic.
Thus, two conclusions can be derived from the
literature review of cognitive heuristics.

First,

heuristics such as the representativeness, availability,
and the anchoring and adjustment heuristics are mental
shortcuts for making judgments in a variety of everyday
situations.

Second, the particular heuristic that is used

in a given situation depends on the factors of that
situation.
Debiasina
The study of the reduction of judgmental errors has
developed across multiple areas of the literature and has,
in general, shown mixed results.

The debiasing literature

covers the areas of risk perception, clinical judgment, and
decision making.

One common factor in this literature is

the study of the reduction of judgment errors that have
been identified in the context of cognitive heuristics, or
mental shortcuts.

An important component of this

literature is that the existing studies have not addressed
the process of debiasing in the context, of emotion, and
more specifically anxiety.
A review of the debiasing techniques is addressed for
relevant findings given their pertinence to the current
study.

In addition, the implications for debiasing in the
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context of anxiety and its association with the pessimistic
judgments of future threat are discussed.
Fischoff (1977) presented one of the first articles on
debiasing of judgmental errors.

Participants were asked to

respond to 75 general questions by assigning a probability
of being correct to two possible answers.

Results

indicated that the. participants overestimated how much they
would have known before being told the answer, a knew-itall-along effect.

In addition, attempts to debias these

judgmental errors, by either informing participants about
the bias or asking them to work harder, failed to result in
a reduction of the bias.
Friedlander and Phillips (1984) investigated the
reduction of anchoring errors in two groups of
undergraduate participants.

A control group and a group

that was warned of anchoring errors were asked to read case
studies in which important information concerning clinical
diagnosis of disease was presented.

The participants

completed both diagnostic judgment ratings and confidence
ratings.

The debiasing method used in the study was an

educational technique that informed the participants of the
possibility of errors in judgment due to the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic.

No anchoring effect was found in the

control group, eliminating the possibility to evaluate the
educational debiasing technique.

However, participant
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confidence ratings in their judgments were found to be low,
resulting in the author's speculation that the low
confidence level led to a decreased susceptibility to the
anchoring effect.

The implication for debiasing was that

the experimental procedures may require stimuli in which
the participants have confidence in their judgments.
Sharpe and Adair (1993) studied the reduction of the
hindsight bias and addressed a rival hypothesis of demand
characteristics.

The hindsight bias is defined as the

increased confidence in judgments after being provided
information as to the validity of the statement.

In two

similar experiments, -participants were provided an
explanation of the hindsight bias and asked to either
produce the bias or not to produce the bias.

When

participants were asked not to produce the hindsight bias,
the hindsight error in judgment was still found.

Further,

when participants were asked to produce the bias,
especially exaggerated judgment ratings were found.

The

authors concluded that the manipulation of instructions
does little to eliminate the hindsight bias.

This

educational technique for debiasing judgments was similar
to the technique use by Friedlander and Phillips

(1984) and

suggests that simple awareness of the judgment error does
not reduce a judgment bias.

Furthermore, Sharpe and Adair

(1993) concluded that an increase in demand characteristics
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can. lead to an even more robust hindsight bias, a finding
that will be discussed in greater detail in the later
section devoted to demand characteristics.
In a study of optimistic biases of perceived health
risks, Weinstein and Klien (1995) investigated several
debiasing techniques in altering ratings of personal health
risks.

In a series of four experiments, participants were

given four different debiasing interventions that were
hypothesized to reduce the optimistic bias.

The debiasing

interventions included educational, imagery, risk factor
focus, and risk factor generation techniques.

All

debiasing methods were unsuccessful in reducing optimistic
risk judgments.

Reminding people of health risks and

having the participants compare themselves to low-risk
people, the educational and imagery debiasing techniques,
did not reduce the optimistic bias.

Furthermore, the tasks

of having participants focus on health problems, the risk
factor focus and risk factor generation debiasing
techniques, actually resulted in an exaggerated bias.
Mumma and Wilson (1995) investigated the debiasing of
anchoring effects in clinical judgments of personality
characteristics.

Participants were presented a description

of an individual's personality characteristics and then
they were asked to make stable/unstable and
introversion/extroversion judgments of that individual.
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Three types of debiasing techniques were used which
included bias inoculation, consider-the-opposite, and note
taking methods.

The bias inoculation technique was an

educational method of debiasing in which the participants
were instructed in the use of an adjustment to compensate
for the initial anchor.

The consider-the-opposite method

had participants focus on opposite personality
characteristics to the cues presented in the description.
Finally, the note taking method had participants write down
the cues of the personality characteristics presented in
the description.

The results indicated that all three

methods of debiasing resulted in a reduction of the
anchoring bias.

In addition, the two methods that forced

participants to focus on the critical information presented
in the description, the consider-the-opposite and note
taking methods, showed a significantly greater reduction in
the anchoring effect in comparison to the educational
method, bias inoculation.

Mumma and Wilson ('1995)

suggested that these two techniques functioned to increase
the accessibility of alternative information to reduce the
anchoring effect.
Hirt and Markman (1995) studied the process with which
debiasing occurs for another judgmental bias called the
explanation bias.

TlSe explanation bias is an increase in

judgments of subjective probability that occurs after
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participants are provided with an explanation of why the
outcome would occur.

In the Hirt and Markman (1995) study,

participants were presented a variety of explanations of
situations, for example a winning sports team, and the
outcome of the likelihood of upcoming games was judged.
Several variations on the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing
technique were used and included generation of multiple
outcomes, generation of the opposite outcome, and
generation of highly unlikely outcomes.

Overall findings

indicated that techniques that involved the generation of
alternative outcomes resulted in a reduction of the
explanation bias.

Hirt and Markman (1995) concluded that

the increased accessibility of alternative information
resulted in the reduction of the explanation bias.
In a study of anchoring effects, Whyte and Sebenius
(1997) investigated the presentation of single versus
multiple anchors in the reduction of the anchoring effect
for both individuals and groups.

Participants were given

information regarding a fictitious product and they were
asked to negotiate the sale of the product.

The results

indicated that participants in a group setting were as
susceptible to the anchoring bias as were individuals.

In

addition, providing the participants with multiple anchors,
and thus increasing the amount of information, did not
reduce the bias.
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In another study of group judgment, Lim and Benbasat
(1997) investigated the debiasing of the representativeness
heuristic.

Participants in groups of three were presented

personality profiles of engineers and lawyers as a modified
base-rate problem originally used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974).

In addition, half of the participants were able to

use a computer generated "problem-representation" tool that
graphically displayed a map of the lawyers and engineers.
Use of the computer generated support system led to greater
awareness of the base-rate fallacy and a reduction in the
representativeness error.

Lim and Benbasat

(1997)

attributed the debiasing result to the increased awareness
of base-rates and the increased, amount of information
available from the computer generated support system.
Overall, the studies on the debiasing of judgment
errors that have been presented thus far are laboratory
investigations of the cognitive heuristics and various
techniques to reduce errors in judgment.

However, there is

another area of the literature that examines debiasing in a
different manner, namely, the study of the reduction of
biases in judgment that result from personal experience.
Dolinski, Gromski, and Zawisza (1989) collected data
from participants in Opole, Poland approximately one week
after the 198 6 explosion of the Chernobyl atomic power
station in the Ukraine.

Participants rated their perceived
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risk and the perceived risk of others for a variety of
negative events including contracting diseases, being
involved in accidents, and being the victim of crime.

In

comparison to the ratings of others, the participants
indicated an unrealistic optimism for their own likelihood
of experiencing future crime, accidents, and for suffering
from heart disease.

However, for negative events related

to radiation exposure, the participants rated themselves as
especially susceptible in comparison to others.

The

results suggest that the personal experience of the
Chernobyl disaster reduced the optimistic bias of perceived
risk for radiation-related negative events.
Burger and Palmer (1992) asked university students who
had experienced the northern California earthquake of 198 9
to estimate the probability that they and other "average"
students would experience several negative life events.
The negative life events used in the study included health,
crime, accident, and natural disaster related outcomes.
The results indicated an unrealistic optimism for the
negative life events related to health, crime, and
accidents.

However, this optimism for the life event

related to natural disasters was not found immediately
after the earthquake.

The optimism for natural disasters

returned three months later.

The results suggest that
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personal experience may lead to a reduction of the
optimistic bias, but only in the short term.
Rutter, Quine, and Albery (1998) studied the
perceptions of risk in motorcyclists.

Participants

completed several questionnaires, rated the likelihood of
accidents and injury for themselves and others, and
reported their history of risky motorcycle riding.

Results

showed that motorcyclists were unrealistically optimistic
about their chances of being in an accident.

Decreased

perceptions of risk were associated with higher age, higher
educational levels, and higher levels of riding experience.
However, when participants who reported having experienced
an accident in the past were compared with those who had no
experience of an accident, a significant difference in the
perceptions of risk was found.

Specifically, experience

with a past accident was associated with a "relative
realism" of perception of risk, a reduced optimistic bias
for the likelihood of future accidents.
Finally, Stapel and Veltuijsen (1996) conducted two
studies to test the hypothesis that indirect experience can
reduce perceptions of risk.

Undergraduate participants

were presented newspaper articles with varying levels of
vividness of the story and self-relevance to the
participants.

The participants then made personal and

societal risk judgments.

The results showed that indirect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31

experience of highly vivid and self-relevant information
was associated with a reduction of perceived risk.

These

findings concerning indirect experience are consistent with
the results of direct experience upon perceived risk
(Burger & Palmer, 1992; Dolinski, Gromski,

& Zawisza, 1989;

Rutter, Quine, & Albery, 1998).
In summary, the current state of the debiasing
literature suggests several conclusions.

First,

educational debiasing strategies appear to do little for
the reduction of the targeted biases.

Second, techniques

that force the participant to focus on the stimuli that
were presented also do not appear to reduce the bias, and
may in fact even create a more robust judgmental bias.
Third, techniques that force the participant to focus on
alternative information or alternative outcomes appear to
significantly reduce the targeted bias.

And finally,

personal experience with negative events appears to reduce
the optimistic bias for that specific event.
A review of the debiasing literature was presented by
Arkes

(1991) .

Arkes introduced three separate categories

of judgment errors which included strategy-based errors,
association-based errors, psychophysically-based errors.
In addition, several techniques to reduce the biases were
proposed.

Specifically, for strategy-based errors, it was

proposed that debiasing should occur when the benefits of
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accurate judgment are increased.

For association-based

errors, debiasing should occur with the performance of a
behavior that activates different associations within the
semantic memory.

Finally, for psychophysically-based

errors, debiasing should occur with a change in the
person's perception of their location on the nonlinear
curve depicting the relationship between the external
stimuli and the response to the stimuli.
The reduction of judgmental errors for the current
study primarily focuses on Arkes'

(1991) association-based

errors and the results of these judgmental bias studies
follows Arkes' proposal of effective debiasing.
Specifically, the studies that show a reduction in
judgmental errors use techniques that serve to activate
alternative associations within semantic memory (Hirt &
Markman, 1995; Lim & Benbasat, 1997; Mumma & Wilson,

1995).

However, it is important to note that the available
literature pertaining to debiasing focuses on simple
strategies to reduce common judgmental errors in normal
populations.

The current study proposes to investigate the

reduction of pessimistic judgmental errors associated with
anxiety.

In the next section, cognitive-behavior therapy

and its role in debiasing will be addressed.
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Role of Debiasincr in Cocrnitive-Behavior Therapy
Possibly the most significant implication of this
study is the role that debiasing may play in cognitivebehavior therapy.

The importance of the reduction of

pessimistic thoughts of future events.has been noted in
established cognitive-behavioral treatment programs.
However, the recognition of thi_s potential benefit for the
treatment of anxiety disorders has not been addressed in
the current cognitive models o f the development and
maintenance of anxiety.

Each of these specific points will

be discussed briefly to emphasize the role that debiasing
may play in cognitive-behavioral treatment of anxiety
disorders.
The reduction of pessimistic predictions of future
events has been recognized as therapeutic in a few
established treatment programs

(Craske, Barlow, & O'Leary,

1992; Barlow & Craske, 1994) .

Specifically, Craske et al.

(19 92) included in their treatment manual for Generalized
Anxiety Disorder a section devoted to the overestimation of
risk.

The treatment program offers several techniques to

reduce the patient's perception of risk including
monitoring exercises and generation of realistic
probabilities of event occurrence.

However, it is

important to note that the Mastery of Your Anxiety and
Worry (MAW) program does not offer the specific treatment
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technique of the generation of alternative outcomes and
only mentions the ultimate goal of considering
alternatives.
Barlow and Craske's

(1994) Mastery of Your Anxiety and

Panic II (MAP-II) treatment program for Panic Disorder also
recognized the importance of the reduction of pessimistic
predictions of future events.

In this treatment program,

monitoring exercises were used as a therapeutic technique
to reduce judgmental errors.

In addition, direct

behavioral testing of predicted threat events combined with
the monitoring was also recommended.
Craske et al.

However,

(1992), Barlow and Craske

similar to

(1994) did not

offer the generation of alternative outcomes as a specific
therapeutic technique to reduce the judgmental errors.
The two treatment programs briefly reviewed above have
been shown to be effective in the treatment of anxiety
disorders

(Craske et al., 1992; Barlow & Craske,

1994).

Unfortunately, the specific components of the programs have
not been empirically studied to investigate the .parts of
the programs that are successful in the reduction of
anxiety symptoms.

The techniques for the reduction of the

overestimation of risk offered by Craske et al.
Barlow and Craske

(1992) and

(1994) do not appear to follow the

empirical findings in the debiasing literature.
Specifically, the techniques offered do not apply a
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generation of alternatives approach to the reduction of
pessimistic predictions of future threatening events.
However, this may be explained by the fact that previous
cognitive models of the development and maintenance of
anxiety have failed to address judgmental biases.
As presented earlier, current cognitive models of
anxiety have emphasized attentional, memory, and judgmental
biases in the development and maintenance of anxiety.

It

remains to be seen what results will be found when specific
techniques for the reduction of cognitive biases are
applied to the treatment of anxiety disorders.

However,

the potential benefit of the alleviation of anxiety
symptoms and behaviors is one possible result of debiasing.
A small body of research exists that has investigated
the cognitive changes that result from treatment.

In

general, these studies have used various measures of
attentional, memory, and judgmental biases before and after
a patient's participation in a treatment program.

It is

hypothesized that some component of the psychotherapy will
result in a reduction of the cognitive biases being
measured.

However, the current stage of the research has

not investigated specific debiasing techniques, nor if the
reduction in the cognitive biases results in an alleviation
of anxiety symptoms and behaviors.
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Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, and Eysenck (1995) had
participants complete both a Stroop color-naming task and a
word completion task before treatment, after treatment, and
at a three-month follow-up.

An anxious group, consisting

of participants with a diagnosis of generalized anxiety
disorder (GAD), was given an anxiety management procedure
that included relaxation training, cognitive coping
strategies, and graded exposure.

The treatment resulted in

a reduction of the cognitive biases.
Mogg, Bradley, Millar, and White (1995) presented a
control group and a group of generalized anxiety patients
(GAD) with a Stroop color-naming task at pre-treatment,
post-treatment, and follow-up.

The treatment consisted of

cognitive and behavioral procedures including relaxation
and cognitive coping techniques.

Initially, the GAD group

showed the expected attentional bias for threat-related
information in comparison to the control group.
treatment, no attentional bias was found.

At post

However, at

follow-up the attentional bias was again significant.

The

results suggest that the cognitive-behavioral treatment was
successful at normalizing the attentional bias.

However,

the attentional bias may not be a stable phenomena in that
it varies over time.
Westling and Ost (1995) had patients respond to body
related and external situations before treatment, after
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treatment, and at a follow-up.

The patients were randomly-

assigned to either an applied relaxation (AR) treatment or
cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT).

At pre-treatment, a

judgmental bias was found that was specific to body related
stimuli, in comparison to the control group.

No threat-

related judgmental bias for external stimuli was found.

At

post—treatment, both AR and CBT were found to lead to a
normalization of the threat bias and there was no
superiority of either treatment method.

The results

suggest that cognitive changes that occur with
psychological treatment include a normalization of threatrelated judgmental errors.
Thus, cognitive and/or behavioral treatment techniques
appear to normalize the attentional, memory, and judgmental
biases associated with anxiety.

Which specific component

or cognitive process of the treatment procedures that
result in this normalization is unclear at this time.
However, the potential benefit of a reduction" in judgmental
cognitive biases is considerable for the treatment of
anxiety.
It is important to note that the normalization of
biases in anxiety has been shown after many sessions of
cognitive-behavior therapy.

The current dissertation

proposes a technique to reduce pessimistic predictions of
future events associated with high levels of anxiety
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responsiveness with a simple strategy in a short period of
time.

However, the study can be viewed as the

investigation of one of the specific components of CBT and
its ability to reduce one specific type of cognitive bias,
namely j udgmental errors.
Demand Characteristics
Demand characteristics are defined as experimental
cues which influence participants to respond in specific
ways that serve to validate the experimental hypothesis
(Fernandez & Turk, 1994).

The importance of demand

characteristics in psychological experiments was
highlighted over 30 years ago in a series of studies and
writings by Orne

(1962, 1970, 1973).

Orne made several assumptions of demand
characteristics that have become a widely shared consensus
among researchers without adequate evidence.

First, Orne

(1970) assumed that experimental participants have a desire
to help science, presumably because the success of the
study will make their service worthwhile.

Second, Orne

(1962) assumed that experimental participants seek to
ascertain the purpose of the study.

Finally, it is assumed

that participants are eager to confirm the hypothesis or
purpose of the study (Orne, 1973).
However, the assumptions of demand characteristics as
outlined by Orne

(1962, 1970, 1973) have not been supported
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in the literature.

In a review of the literature,

Berkowitz and Troccoli (198 6) concluded that there is
little support for Orne's assumptions.
In a study that examined the tendency of participants
to confirm a hypothesis from the experimental cues,
Buchwald, Strack, and Coyne (1981) investigated a mood
induction procedure and assessed the participants' belief
that their level of affect would be influenced..

The

results showed that although a clear mood induction
occurred, the participants believed that their feelings
could not be influenced by reading and thinking about the
statements given in the induction procedure.

Stated

simply, although experimental cues for mood induction were
present, i.e. demand characteristics, the participants did
not show a conscious willingness or desire to confirm the
hypothesis.
The findings presented thus far suggest that the
assumptions of demand characteristics as presented by Orne
(1962-, 1970, 1973) may be flawed.

However, these findings

are not suggestive that an alteration of responses due to
experimental cues does not occur.
and Troccoli

As proposed by Berkowitz

(1986), it is possible that the role of demand

characteristics is exaggerated.

However, it remains a

possibility that experimental cues alter responses of
experimental participants in measurable ways.
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For example, Alloy, Abramson, and Viscusi (1981) and
Polivy and Doyle (1980) also studied a mood induction
procedure and asked participants to simulate the affective
reaction.

In both studies, a pattern of "over-reaction"

was noted where the participants gave more extreme
responses than the actual mood induction.

The mood

induction itself was unresponsive to demand
characteristics.

These results suggest that experimental

demand may lead to an exaggerated result, while showing
little ability to reduce the mood induction.
In the only study that has specifically addressed
demand characteristics in the debiasing of judgments,
Sharpe and Adair (1993) investigated the reduction of the
hindsight bias while manipulating instructions.
Participants were informed of the errors in judgment
associated with the hindsight bias.

They were asked either

to produce or to not produce the bias by manipulation of
instructions.

In the group that was asked to* not produce

the hindsight bias, the low demand condition, the bias was
unaffected by the instruction.

However, in the group that

was asked to produce the hindsight bias, the high demand
condition, biased judgments were found to be even more
elevated indicating a more robust hindsight bias.

The

authors concluded that manipulation of instructions does
little to reduce the judgmental errors associated with the
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hindsight bias.

Furthermore, an increase in demand

characteristics appeared to lead to an even more robust
hindsight bias.

It is important to emphasize that

manipulation of demand characteristics did not result in a
reduction of the hindsight bias, but an exaggeration of the
bias.

This finding supports the results of Alloy,

Abramson, and Viscusi

(1981) and Polivy and Doyle

(198 0).

Thus, demand characteristics remain a rival hypothesis
for the debiasing of judgmental errors.

Although the

assumptions of demand characteristics may be flawed, as
outlined by Orne (1962, 1970, 1973), the specific study of
the relationship between experimental demand and the
debiasing of judgmental errors in anxiety remains to be
accomplished.
It is important to note for the purpose of the current
study the two main methods used in the investigation of
demand characteristics.

First, experimental demand is

often manipulated by the presentation of different
instructions creating groups of high and low demand
characteristics

(Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981; Polivy &

Doyle, 1980; Sharpe & Adair, 1993).

Second, several

studies have used a procedure that includes a debriefing
strategy in which participants are explicitly questioned
after the experiment to probe for the possibility that they
were responding to the experimental cues of the study
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(Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim, 1996).

It is this

debriefing strategy and the inclusion of a second set of
prediction stimuli that will be used in the current study
to probe for the demand present within the experimental
treatment.

From this review of the research literature, it was
possible to construct a formulation of the theoretical
concepts for this study.

Situational anxiety can be

produced by adverse life events and stressors.

Individuals

with higher levels of anxiety responsiveness have been
shown to be more likely to attend to, encode, and recall
threat-related information.

In addition, it has more

recently been shown that anxious individuals are also
likely to judge future events as more threatening.
Thus, anxious individuals have threat-related
information that is more available than non-threat
information, which may result in the judgment of future
events that are similarly threat-related.

Therefore, the

combination of easily recalled threatening information,
availability of this information, and predictions of future
threat may be a factor in the development and maintenance
of anxiety disorders.
The debiasing of judgmental errors has been suggested
to occur when the activation of alternative associations
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within memory occurs.

According to the probability

forecasting literature, the information that is available
at the time of prediction is directly related to the
accuracy of the prediction.

In the case of higher levels

of anxiety, the information that is available is likely to
be threat-related, leading to pessimistic predictions of
future threat.
However, if an individual with higher levels of
anxiety can learn to or, in the case of the current study,
be instructed to consider alternative information, the
available information at the time of prediction is less
likely to be threat-related.

This availability of more

neutral or even positive information may lead to
predictions of future events that are less threat-related.
This process of availability of information leading to
predictions may be different for males and females.

As

reported earlier, Bentz and Williamson (1998) and Bentz et
a l . (1999) found an interaction of anxiety and gender upon
future threat probability judgments such that highly
anxious female participants responded with the most
pessimistic judgments of future events.

Previous studies

(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) have hypothesized that gender
differences in ruminative thinking may account for
differences in the prevalence of depression.

Therefore,

one possible explanation of this interaction between gender
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and anxiety is that women may perceive the environment as
more threatening, resulting in the interaction of gender
and actual life events that produces anxiety to yield more
pessimistic probability ratings in highly anxious females.
The study of a judgmental bias associated with anxiety
and the availability mechanism that theoretically results
in judgment errors can be criticized due to a
methodological problem.

Specifically, the obvious nature

of the experimental tasks used in previous studies

(Bentz &

Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999) leads to a demand
characteristic rival interpretation of the findings.
Stated simply, the judgmental biases may have been due to
the participants perception of the experimental cues
inherent within the procedures.
Thus, it was the goal of the current study to
investigate one debiasing technique, the Consider-AnAlternative procedure

(Hirt & Markman, 1995) and its

ability to reduce judgmental errors.

In addition, the

rival hypothesis of demand characteristics was examined as
a possible explanation of any findings of the reduction of
judgmental errors.
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Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted in order to test two
essential methodological questions that are central to the
completion of the dissertation.

First, it was

methodologically essential for the dependent variable to be
demonstrated as a sensitive measure of the reduction in
probability ratings that was expected with the debiasing
procedure.

Without such a measure, it was possible that

the study would be unable to detect the reduction in the
prediction bias ultimately resulting in a null finding due
to a type II error.
Second, in a study that investigates the role of
demand characteristics it was methodologically essential to
demonstrate that the experimental cues inherent within the
stimuli themselves were not causing a response bias.

If

the experimental cues inherent within the stimuli were
found to cause a systematic response bias, the response
bias would confound any results that were found to be due
to an experimental manipulation.

Given the obvious nature

of the experimental task in the current study, reading
situations and judging outcomes, addressing the
experimental demand inherent within the stimuli themselves
averts this possible methodological criticism.
Therefore, a pilot study was conducted with two
separate experiments, each of which was designed to address
45
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one of the methodological questions.

Phase 1 of the pilot

study was designed to address the question of the
sensitivity of the dependent variable.

Phase 2 addressed

the demand characteristics inherent within the experimental
stimuli.
Phase 1
Desian/Rationale

Phase 1 of the pilot study was

designed to test the sensitivity of the dependent variable,
probability ratings of future threat-related events.

Phase

1 was designed to demonstrate that the participant's
probability ratings would be a sensitive measure of the
changes in perceived threat that was expected with the
debiasing procedure.

Specifically, it was hypothesized

that the participant's probability ratings would decrease
due to the Consider-An-Alternative

(Hirt & Markman, 1995)

debiasing procedure, when probability ratings are compared
from pre to post testing.
An experimental design that was similar to the
dissertation study was chosen for two reasons.

First, the

design and procedures for Phase 1 of the pilot study were
identical to those proposed for the dissertation, and
therefore will mimic any results due to debiasing.

Second,

a design for Phase 1 that included the debiasing procedure
was chosen because this technique was essential to the
demonstration of a sensitive dependent variable.
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Specifically, a repeated measures design was chosen in
which the participants complete the identical experimental
stimuli twice, separated b y the Consider-An-Alternative
debiasing procedure, in a pre-post design.

The

experimental stimuli used i n Phase 1 of the pilot study
were the identical positive and negative stimuli (Appendix
A and Appendix B) that were used in the dissertation.

The

debiasing procedure was used in Phase 1 because this
technique was expected to show a decrease in probability
ratings for the dissertation.

Therefore, the debiasing

procedure offers the most ILikely chance of demonstrating
the sensitivity of the dependent variable.
In addition, in order to further increase the
likelihood that the sensitivity of the dependent variable
would be demonstrated, only participants with a high level
of anxiety responsiveness were included in Phase 1.

A

criterion for inclusion in Phase 1 of the pilot study was
set at a trait anxiety T-score of 60 or above on the State
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch,
R. L., & Lushene, R. E., 1370).

The criterion for

participation was chosen b«ecause it provided a group of
participants that were most important for the dependent
variable to be able to measure changes in probability
estimates.

Stated simply,

if no change in probability

estimates was detected for a group of highly anxious
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participants,

then it would be even less likely that the

dependent variable would be a sensitive measure for
participants with lower levels of anxiety responsiveness.
Participants

A total of 4 9 students were screened for

participation in Phase 1 of the study.

Twelve students met

the criteria of a trait anxiety T-score of 60 or above
male and 9 female).

(3

The sample included a racial make up

of five Caucasian (41.7%), five Hispanic (41.7%), and two
African-American

(16.7%) participants.

the sample was 19.5 years

The average age of

(££ = 1.8 years) .

Finally, the

mean trait anxiety for the participants was a T-score of
65.5

(£12 = 6.7) .
Results

Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted,

one each for the positive and negative experimental
stimuli.

The repeated measures variable utilized in the

analyses were the pre and post-testing probability ratings.
For the negative experimental stimuli, a significant
main effect for the within subject repeated measure was
found (£[1,11] = 4.94, p. < .05).

Average probability

ratings for the negative pre-testing (mean = 59.9%, £ £ =
11.65) and the negative post-testing (mean = 53.1%, SD =
14.39) showed a decrease in future threat estimates as
hypothesized.

For the positive experimental stimuli, the

repeated measure was found to be nonsignificant (£[1,11] =
2.94, p = NS) .
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Discussion

Phase 1 of the pilot study was designed to

test the sensitivity of the dependent variable by
demonstrating that the participant's probability ratings
would be a sensitive measure of the changes in perceived
threat that were expected with the debiasing procedure.
The analysis showed that there was a significant difference
in threat probability ratings from pre to post-testing,
when separated by the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing
procedure.

This finding suggests that the dependent

variable, probability ratings, is a sensitive measure of
the changes in likelihood estimates that were expected in
the -dissertation.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the

dependent variable can be relied upon as a sensitive
measure for the dissertation.
Phase 2
Design/Rationale

Phase 2 of the pilot study was

designed to demonstrate that the demand characteristics
inherent within the experimental stimuli (Appendix A and
Appendix B) were not causing a systematic response bias.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants who
complete only the negative experimental stimuli would show
no difference in probability ratings in comparison to
participants who completed both the positive and negative
stimuli.

In addition, it was hypothesized that the same
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pattern of results would be found with the positive
experimental stimuli.
Again, Phase 2 of the pilot study included a design
that was similar to the dissertation study to create groups
that were as analogous to the dissertation groups as
possible.

Three groups of participants were administered

the experimental stimuli in a pre-post repeated measures
design.

The experimental stimuli utilized in Phase 2 were

identical to the stimuli that were used in the
dissertation.

Group 1 completed both the positive and

negative experimental stimuli.
negative stimuli.

Group 2 completed only the

Finally, Group 3 completed only the

positive experimental stimuli.
If the demand characteristics inherent within the
experimental stimuli were causing a systematic response
bias, then the participants who received only the negative
stimuli (Group 2) would respond with more extreme
probability ratings in comparison to the participants who
received both the positive and negative stimuli

(Group 1).

In addition, the opposite pattern of responses would be
expected when comparing Group 3 and Group 1, if the demand
characteristics inherent within the stimuli were causing a
response bias.

However, this pattern of response was not

expected due to the deliberate construction of the
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experimental stimuli to disguise its purpose with positive
items, negative items, and reverse scored items.
Participants

A total of 57 participants comprised the

sample of Phase 2 of the pilot study (24 male and 33
female).

The sample was primarily Caucasian (n = 35,

61.4%), with 11 Hispanic (19.3%), seven African-American
(12.3%), and four participants identified as other ethnic
origin (7.0%).
22.09 years

The average age of the participants was

(££ = 6.4 years).

Finally, the mean trait

anxiety T-score for the sample was 50.7
Results

Two repeated measures 2 X 2

(£1) = 8.9).
ANCOVAs

(Group X

Repeated Measure) were conducted, one each for the positive
and negative experimental stimuli.

Stated simply, Group 1

was compared to Group 2 in the repeated measure ratings of
future threat-related events and Group 1 was compared to
Group 3 in the repeated measure ratings of future positive
events.

The repeated measures variable utilized in the

analyses were the average pre and post-testing probability
ratings.

Trait anxiety was used as the covariate to

statistically control for the variance due to anxiety
responsiveness.
For the negative experimental stimuli, no significant
main effects for group (£[1,35] = 0.08, p = NS) or the
repeated measure

(£[1,35] = 0.50, p = NS) were found.

In

addition, the interaction between group and the repeated
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measure was found to be nonsignificant (£[1,35] = 0.83, p =
NS).

Trait anxiety was found to be a significant covariate

(£.[34] = 2 . 3 0 , p < .05) .
A similar pattern of results was found for the
positive experimental stimuli.
were found for group

No significant main effects

(£[1,36] =0.67, p = NS) or the

repeated measure (£[1,36] = 2.97, p. = NS) .

Again, the

interaction between the independent variables was found to
be nonsignificant

(£[1,36] = 0.93, p = NS) .

Finally, trait

anxiety was again found to be a significant covariate
(£[35] = 3.59, p < .005) .
Discussion

Phase 2 of the pilot study was designed to

demonstrate that the demand characteristics inherent within
the experimental stimuli were not causing a systematic
response bias.

As hypothesized, no significant differences

were found between the group that completed both the
positive and negative stimuli in comparison to the two
groups that completed just one set of the experimental
stimuli.

In addition, trait anxiety was found to be

significantly correlated to probability ratings of both the
positive and negative stimuli.
These results suggest that the demand characteristics
inherent within the experimental stimuli would not cause a
systematic pattern of response that would confound any
results of the dissertation.

Therefore, it can be assumed
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that any main effects found for the high or low demand
groups in the dissertation may be due to the experimental
manipulation and not to a confound of the experimental cues
inherent within the stimuli.
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Methods
Participants

Initially, a sample of 476 (197 male and 279 female)
undergraduate students participated in the study.

The

participants were screened for inclusion using the Trait
form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI:
Spielberger et al.,
responsiveness.

1970) as the measure of anxiety

All participants were volunteers recruited

through undergraduate psychology classes and sign-up sheets
posted in the psychology department of Texas Wesleyan
University in Fort Worth, Texas.

Extra credit was given to

all students who participated in the study.

The initial

sample was primarily Caucasian (n = 330, 69.3%), with the
remainder of the participants reporting an ethnic make-up
consisting of 70 (14.7%) African American, 43 (9.0%)
Hispanic, and 33 (6.9%) participants identified as other
ethnic origin.

The average age for the sample of

undergraduate students was 23.13 years
Range = 17 to 55 years).

(£1) = 6.17 years,

Finally, the mean STAI trait

anxiety T-score for the sample was found to be 51.90

(iLQ. =

1 0 .02 ) .

A criterion for inclusion in the highly anxious group
was set at a T-score of 65 or greater on the trait form of
the STAI.

Data collection was continued until a minimum of

15 male and 15 female participants were found for both the
54
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debiasing and control groups that met the STAI T-score
criteria for inclusion in the highly anxious group.

Thus,

the highly anxious group consisted of a minimum of 60
participants, 15 males for both the debiasing and control
groups and 15 females for the same two treatment groups.
Participants who were included in the "normal" anxiety
group were randomly selected from the remaining students
assessed with the STAI.

A trait anxiety criterion for

inclusion in the "normal" group was set at a T-score of 60
or less on the STAI.

In addition, the participants

included within the "normal" group were matched to the
highly anxious participants on several variables including
treatment group, age, gender, and race.
minimum number of 60 participants,

Accordingly, a

15 males for both the

debiasing and control groups and 15 females for the same
two treatment groups, within the "normal" anxiety group
were identified for inclusion.

Therefore, the total sample

for the experiment was, at a minimum, set at 12 0
participants.
For both the highly anxious and "normal" groups, a
total of 132 undergraduate students were found who met
criteria for inclusion in the study.

The racial

composition of the sample was primarily Caucasian (n. = 106,
80.3%), with the remaining participants identified as
African American (n = 16, 12.1%), Hispanic (n = 6, 4.5%),
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and other ethnic origin (n = 4, 3.0%).
the study participants was 22.07 years
Range = 18 to 43 years).

The average age of
(21) = 4.08 years,

Finally, the average STAI trait

anxiety T-score for the participants within the highly
anxious group was found to be 69.41
to 82).

(22 = 4.70, Range = 65

For the "normal" group, the average STAI trait

anxiety T-score was 49.77

(22 = 6.01, Range = 35 to 60) .

With one notable exception, the demographic data for
the highly anxious and "normal" groups were equal due to
the matching of study participants.

Divided in terms of

gender and treatment group, the number of highly anxious
male participants in the control group and the debiasing
group was 15, while highly anxious female participants
within the control group numbered 20 and within the
debiasing group numbered 16.

However, one male African

American (Age = 32 years) participant in the highly anxious
group was matched to another participant in the "normal"
group with one year difference in age (Age = 33 years).
This match was performed because no exact match was found.
Finally, three participants identified as highly anxious
were excluded from the study because no close match could
be found due to difficult age and race matching.
Assessment Measures
Soielberaer State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
STAI

The

(STAI: Spielberger et a l ., 1970) is a paper and pencil
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inventory designed to measure both state and trait anxiety.
The trait form was used for the measurement of the level of
anxiety responsiveness in all participants and was used to
group the subjects into a highly anxious and a "normal"
group.

The criteria for inclusion in the highly anxious

group was any

participant that scored at or above a STAI

T-

score of 65.

The criteria for

inclusion in

the "normal"

group was any

participant that

scored at or

below a STAIT-

score of 60.

Evidence for the reliability and validity of

the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory has been reported in
previous studies

(Martuza & Kallstrom, 1974).

Experimental Stimuli

A total of twenty experimental

stimuli were constructed, ten of which present negative
(threat-related)

situations, and ten of which present

positive situations with content matched to the negative.
The stimuli were constructed, with minor modifications,
from the threat-related prediction paragraphs validated by
Bentz and Williamson (1998).

Validation of the prediction

paragraphs included participant ratings which demonstrated
that the stimuli were perceived as threatening.
Specifically, the study (Bentz & Williamson, 1998)
established that the threat-related experimental stimuli
used in the present investigation were perceived as
significantly more threatening than a second set of
stimuli.

In addition, Bentz and Williamson

(1998)
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demonstrated the validity of the deliminated number line
rating, used in the current investigation, in comparison to
two other rating procedures which included a nondeliminated number line and a Likert scale.

The

experimental stimuli, judgment ratings, and questions are
presented in the Appendix A and Appendix B.

The randomized

stimuli are separated into the pre-testing (Appendix A) and
the post-testing

(Appendix B) experimental stimuli.

The

order of presentation of the stimuli to the study
participants is illustrated in Figure 1.
Half of the prediction questions for the pre and post
testing stimuli were reverse scored in order to disguise
the measurement of pessimistic predictions.

An equal

number of reverse scored questions were presented in each
of the pre and post-testing.

Thus, the pre-testing

consists of a total of twenty experimental stimuli, ten
each of positive and negative

(threat-related)

stimuli.

Furthermore, each of the ten positive and ten negative
stimuli presented in the pre-testing had five prediction
questions that were reverse scored.

The twenty pre-testing

experimental stimuli, thus, resulted in five negative
situations with negative questions, five negative
situations with positive questions, five positive
situations with negative questions, and finally five
positive situations with positive questions.
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Pre-Testing

T rg.atmg.nt Post-Testing

Debrief

group
Control

A,

E

D

B,F

G

Debiasing

A, E

C

B,F

G

A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-

Pre-Testing Experimental Stimuli (Appendix A)
Post-Testing Experimental Stimuli (Appendix B)
Consider-An-Alternative Debiasing Stimuli (Appendix C)
Control Stimuli (Appendix D)
Pre-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli (Appendix E)
Post-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli (Appendix F)
Debriefing Questions (Appendix G)

Figure 1
Diagram of the study experimental design and order of
presentation of the stimuli in each phase of the study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

post-testing, the same twenty paragraphs were presented
with the opposite prediction questions to the pre-testing
stimuli.
Only the ratings from the negative (threat)

stimuli

were utilized in the statistical analysis for three
reasons.

First, this study was mainly interested in the

reduction of pessimistic predictions of future negative
events that may result from debiasing, not the reduction of
optimistic predictions.

Second, the inclusion of the

ratings from the positive stimuli in the statistical
analysis would raise the complexity of findings to a level
that would make interpretation difficult.

Finally, changes

in the ratings of the positive stimuli were, theoretically,
less important than the negative (threat) stimuli because
the debiasing procedure includes only the generation of
positive outcomes.
The purpose of the inclusion of the positive stimuli
within the pre and post-testing was to disguise the
objective of the stimuli as much as possible

in order

minimize the demand characteristics inherent

within the

stimuli themselves.

to

The methodological question of whether

the demand characteristics inherent within the experimental
stimuli were causing a systematic response bias was
addressed in Phase 2 of the pilot study.
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Consider—An—Alternative Debiasincr Stimuli

The

Consider-An-Alternative debiasing procedure was constructed
to model the procedures used by Hirt and Markman (1995) and
to achieve the goal of increasing the salience and
accessibility of alternative outcomes of the experimental
situations.

Specifically, the twenty experimental stimuli

identical to the ten positive and ten negative pre and
post-testing stimuli were presented.

Participants were

then asked to generate three positive alternative outcomes,
which forced the activation of alternative information.
The generation of alternatives was only completed by
the debiasing group and not the control group.

The

debiasing stimuli are presented in Appendix C and the order
of presentation of the stimuli to the study participants is
illustrated in Figure 1.

It is important to note that none

of the experimental demand stimuli

(Appendix E and Appendix

F), described below, were presented within the debiasing
condition.
Control Stimuli

The control condition stimuli were

constructed to present the participants with the identical
experimental situations of the pre and post-testing stimuli
in order to control for effects due to habituation to the
stimuli.

However, the participants made no judgment

ratings but only responded with writing the nouns and verbs
found within the experimental paragraphs.

The writing of
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the parts of speech found within the paragraphs was
included to ensure that the participants read each
situation.

The control condition stimuli are presented in

Appendix D and the order of presentation of the stimuli to
the study participants is illustrated in Figure 1.

Just as

with the debiasing condition stimuli above, none of the
experimental demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix F),
described below, were presented within the control
condition.
Experimental Demand Stimuli

A second set of

prediction stimuli were constructed to measure the possible
changes in probability ratings due to the demand
characteristics inherent within the debiasing procedure.
The experimental demand stimuli were included as a
manipulation check to ensure that any change in probability
ratings of the threat stimuli was due to debiasing and not
due to the experimental demand placed upon the participants
to change their ratings.
The experimental demand stimuli were constructed to
present the participants with six situations and outcomes
for their probability judgment.

The six situations were

constructed to be related to the outcomes of games for two
reasons.

First, the game situations are relatively common

and easy to imagine and judge.

Second, the game situations
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were generally unrelated to the positive and negative
situations presented in the pre-testing and post-testing.
The game situations and outcomes are presented in
Appendix E and Appendix F.

Again, the order of

presentation of the stimuli to the study participants is
illustrated in Figure 1.

The six game situations were

randomly placed within the pre-testing and the post-testing
experimental stimuli, with the stimuli placed within the
pre-testing (Appendix E) and the stimuli placed within the
post-testing
exception.

(Appendix F) being identical with one notable
Specifically, as with the pre and post-testing

experimental stimuli, half of the experimental demand
stimuli were reverse scored.

Thus, in the experimental

demand stimuli, three questions were worded in terms of
"what is the probability you will win" and three questions
were worded in terms of "what is the probability you will
lose."

The opposite question for each situation was

presented in the pre and post-testing.
The experimental demand stimuli were presented
randomly within the pre and post-testing, resulting in a
total of 2 6 items in each of the pre and post-testing
phases of the experiment.

Thus, each pre and post-testing

consisted of the 20 positive and negative experimental
stimuli plus the six experimental demand stimuli.

However,

the six experimental demand stimuli were not presented
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within the control or debiasing treatment phase of the
experiment in contrast to the 20 experimental stimuli.
This design created a measure of the demand
characteristics inherent within the debiasing treatment.
Specifically, if the study participants were responding to
the experimental cues inherent within the debiasing
procedure, then they would reduce their probability ratings
on the post-testing experimental demand stimuli (Appendix
F) and the post-testing experimental stimuli (Appendix B)
equally.

Conversely, if the study participants were

responding to the debiasing procedure as hypothesized, then
they would reduce their probability ratings on only the
post-testing experimental stimuli

(Appendix B) and not on

the post-testing experimental demand stimuli

(Appendix F ) .

As illustrated in Figure 1, the experimental demand stimuli
were not presented in the treatment phase of the
experiment.

Therefore, positive alternatives for these

demand stimuli were not generated in the treatment phase of
the experiment resulting in no activation of alternative
information and a measure of the demand characteristics
inherent within the debiasing procedure.
Debriefing Questions

The debriefing questions were

designed to assess for the possibility that the
participants were responding to the experimental cues of
the study.

The debriefing questions were constructed to
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assess whether the participant's perception of the purpose
of the experiment was that they should have changed their
probability ratings because that was what they thought the
experiment was intended to find.

The debriefing procedure

has been utilized in previous studies for the assessment of
demand characteristics

(Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim,

1996).
Specifically, the debriefing questions, presented in
the Appendix G, were three multiple choice questions which
explicitly ask the participants what they perceived as the
purpose of the study.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the

debriefing questions were presented to all the study
participants at the end of the experiment.

These questions

were used to group participants according to their
perceptions of the purpose of the study to investigate
demand characteristics.
The first debriefing question was used to categorize
all participants into four groups, according to the four
multiple choice answers.

The groups included (1)

participants who responded that the purpose of the study
was to increase their threat probability ratings,

(2) those

who responded that the purpose was to decrease their threat
probability ratings,

(3) those who responded that the

purpose was to make no changes in probability ratings, and
finally (4) those who responded that they did not know the
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purpose of the experiment.

These groups were analyzed in

combination with the ratings from the experimental demand
stimuli to test for the impact of demand characteristics
upon probability ratings.
Finally, the third debriefing question was also be
used to group participants as a test of demand
characteristics.

Specifically, the question was used to

categorize all participants into two groups, according to
the two possible answers.

The two groups included (1)

participants who responded that they did notice a procedure
that suggested the purpose of the experiment was to change
their probability ratings because they were generating
alternative ways the situations may end, and (2) those who
responded that they did not notice such a procedure.
Again, the groups were analyzed in combination with the
ratings from the experimental demand stimuli to test for
the impact of demand characteristics upon probability
ratings.
Experimental Procedures
Undergraduate participants were recruited through
sign-up sheets posted in the psychology department and
through psychology classes at Texas Wesleyan University in
Fort Worth, Texas.

All participants were given extra

credit for their undergraduate classes.

The experiments

were conducted in group settings either during scheduled
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experiment times or at the end of undergraduate classes
where permission was obtained from the class instructor.
The students began the experiment by reading and signing
the informed consent form (Appendix H ) .

The informed

consent form was read verbally by the experimenter to
ensure understanding and all participants were given the
opportunity to ask questions.
After consent was obtained, participants then
completed a short demographic questionnaire and the trait
form of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI: Spielberger et al., 1970).

Participants were then

randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups.

The

experimental groups included the control group and the
debiasing group.
After randomization, participants were given a packet
of information that included the experimental stimuli and
directions for completion.

The packet consisted of the 20

positive and negative experimental stimuli (Appendix A) and
the six game-related demand stimuli (Appendix E), all
randomly presented to the participants.

The experimenter

reviewed the instructions by reading the directions aloud
while the participants followed on the written directions
provided.

Questions were answered by the experimenter and

an example reviewed, then the participants were allowed to
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complete the initial examination, the pre-testing.

There

was no time limit for completion of the instrument.
Following the completion of the pre-testing, each of
the two experimental groups completed their respective
tasks as outlined below in the treatment groups section.
Following the completion of the experimental treatment, all
participants again completed the experimental stimuli, the
post-testing stimuli presented in the Appendix B and the
Appendix F, in a similar fashion to the pre-testing.
Again, the stimuli in the post-testing included the 20
positive and negative experimental stimuli
the six game-related stimuli

(Appendix B) and

(Appendix F), all randomly-

presented to the participants.

Finally, after completion

of the post-testing stimuli, the participants were given
the three debriefing questions presented in the Appendix G.
Participants simply circled one response to each of the
three questions.

Upon completion of the debriefing

questions, all materials were collected and extra credit
were given to each participant.
Treatment Groups
The debiasing group completed the Consider-AnAlternative debiasing procedure (Hirt & Markman,

19 95) as

the treatment procedure in the pre-post experimental
design.

This procedure consisted of the presentation of

the same 20 experimental situations as presented in the
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pre-testing, followed by the generation of three
alternative positive outcomes for each of the situations.
Participants generated outcomes by simply writing three
possible positive alternatives for the situation outcomes
(Hirt & Markman, 1995; Mumma & Wilson, 1995).

The stimuli

for the debiasing group procedure are presented in Appendix
C.

It is important to note that none of the game-related

experimental demand stimuli were presented during the
debiasing treatment procedure.
The control group read the same 20 experimental
situations as the debiasing group.

However, instead of

generating alternative positive outcomes, the participants
wrote all of the nouns and verbs found in the situation
paragraph.

The recording of the parts of speech in the

control group was included to ensure that the participants
completely read each situation.

The identical presentation

of the 20 experimental situations was completed to control
for any effects due to habituation.

The stimuli for the

control group procedure are presented in Appendix D.
Again, it is important to note that none of the gamerelated experimental demand stimuli were presented during
the control treatment procedure.
Experimental

Design

The experimental design of the study was a 2 X 2 X 2 X
2 (Pre versus Post-Testing X Control versus Debiasing
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Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus
Female) repeated measures factorial design.

The design

included one within subject independent variable, the
repeated measure, that consisted of the pre and post
testing ratings of the participant's probability estimates.
The between subject independent variables included the two
treatment groups (Control and Debiasing Groups), the two
anxiety groups consisting of a high and a "normal" level of
anxiety responsiveness, and the two gender groups.

Thus, a

total of four independent variables were included in the
study.
The dependent variable for the study was the average
score of the 10 threat probability ratings obtained from
the pre and post-testing experimental stimuli.

As stated

earlier, only the ratings from the 10 negative (threat)
experimental stimuli were utilized in the statistical
analysis.

The ten positive experimental stimuli were

included to disguise the purpose of the study and were not
included in the statistical analysis.
Statistical Analyses/Hypotheses
The analyses utilized in this study conducted several
statistical procedures for the purpose of examining the
experimental data.

As a result, it is important to note

that the overall experiment-wise error rate was considered,
and the appropriate statistical procedures and alpha levels
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chosen.

For example, several mixed, factorial Analysis of

Variance statistical procedures were used to control for
the elevation of Type I error.

In addition, an alpha level

of .05 was chosen as the level of significance for all
statistical procedures, with one exception noted in the
results section due to post-hoc testing.

Specifically, a

Bonferroni correction of the alpha level was made for posthoc testing which resulted in a lower alpha level for the
post-hoc analysis.

All statistical findings falling above

the alpha of .05 were noted as nonsignificant

(NS), with

the post-hoc analysis notation of nonsignificant results
adjusted due to the Bonferroni correction of the alpha
level as indicated in the results section.
Threat Ratings Analysis

Probability ratings for each

of the ten threat-related situations

(Appendix A and

Appendix B) were scored by recording the value of the
participant'' s rating on the number lines.

The responses

from the five positively worded questions were reverse
scored to obtain the pessimistic ratings for all five
items.

Then, all ten threat-related ratings were averaged

to yield a mean threat probability rating for each
participant.

These data were utilized as the dependent

variable in the statistical analysis investigating the
threat ratings.
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A mixed factorial 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures
analysis of variance (Pre versus Post-Testing X Control
versus Debiasing Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X
Male versus Female Gender) was conducted to test for
differences in the four independent variables.

In addition

to testing for main effects for each independent variable,
the repeated measures ANOVA allowed the testing of all
interaction effects between the four independent variables.
It was hypothesized that highly anxious participants
would report higher probability estimates of future threatrelated events relative to participants with a "normal"
level of anxiety responsiveness.

Stated simply, a main

effect for anxiety was expected.

Second, it was

hypothesized that a two-way interaction of treatment group
and repeated measure upon threat probability ratings would
be found.

The debiasing procedure was expected to reduce

threat probability ratings from pre to post-testing, while
the control procedure was not expected to cause a
systematic change in threat ratings.

Therefore, the

hypothesized interaction was expected to result in the
post-testing probability ratings of the debiasing group to
be significantly lower than the ratings of the control
group (pre and post-testing)
the debiasing group.

and the pre-testing ratings of

Finally, it was hypothesized that a

two-way interaction of gender and anxiety upon threat
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probability ratings would be found.

Highly anxious female

participants were expected to show greater pessimistic
predictions of future threat than all male participants and
female participants with a lower level of anxiety
responsiveness.
A main effect for trait anxiety was expected because
of previous studies that have found increased pessimistic
predictions of future threat associated with higher levels
of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et a l ., 1999).
The two-way interaction of treatment group and repeated
measure upon threat probability ratings was expected
because of previous investigations that have found the
Consider-An-Alternative debiasing procedure to be effective
in the reduction of judgmental errors
1995; Mumma & Wilson, 1995) .

(Hirt & Markman,

Finally, the two-way

interaction of gender and anxiety upon threat probability
ratings was expected due to previous studies that have
shown this interaction (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et
al., 1999).
Demand Ratings Analysis

A second analysis was

conducted to test for effects due to demand characteristics
inherent within the debiasing procedure.

Specifically, the

data collected from the six experimental demand stimuli
(Appendix E and Appendix F) were analyzed as a separate
dependent variable.

Probability ratings from each of the
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six game-related situations were scored and averaged in a
similar fashion to the experimental stimuli to yield a mean
experimental demand probability rating for each
participant.
The use of the experimental demand ratings as the
dependent variable created a new independent variable.
Specifically, the control versus debiasing independent
variable of the threat ratings analysis was changed to a
demand versus no demand independent variable.

This change

was accomplished because the game-related dependent
variable of the demand ratings analysis was not presented
during the treatment phase of the repeated measure design
(Figure 1).

Thus, a new independent variable was created

that measured the changes in probability ratings due to the
experimental cues inherent within the treatment procedure.
As explained earlier in the section devoted to the
experimental demand stimuli, if the study participants were
responding to the experimental cues inherent within the
debiasing procedure, then they would reduce their
probability ratings on the post-testing experimental demand
stimuli

(Appendix F) and the post-testing experimental

stimuli

(Appendix B) equally.

The experimental cues of the

debiasing procedure would decrease the ratings of both the
threat and game-related stimuli, even though the
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participants were not generating positive alternatives for
the game-related stimuli.
Conversely, if the study participants were responding
to the debiasing procedure as hypothesized, then they would
reduce their probability ratings on only the post-testing
experimental stimuli

(Appendix B) and not on the post

testing experimental demand stimuli (Appendix F) .

In this

case, the debiasing procedure of generating positive
alternatives would decrease the probability ratings of only
the threat-related stimuli because positive alternatives
were not generated for the game-related stimuli.
Thus, the analysis of the threat-related ratings
examined the effects of the treatment procedure.
Furthermore, the analysis of the game-related ratings
examined the effects of the experimental demand within the
treatment procedure.

The current demand ratings analysis

uses only the game-related ratings as the dependent
variable and therefore the independent variable of control
versus debiasing treatment is converted to a demand versus
no demand independent variable.
A similar 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of
variance

(Pre versus Post— Testing X Demand versus No Demand

Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus
Female Gender) was utilized for the analysis.

The

independent variables for the analysis again included one
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within subject and three between subject variables.

The

within subject variable was the repeated measure (pre and
post-testing) of experimental demand stimuli.

The three

between subject variables included (1) the two treatment
groups consisting of a demand group versus a no demand
group,

(2) the two anxiety groups consisting of a high and

"normal" level of anxiety responsiveness, and finally (3)
gender.

The dependent variable was the average participant

probability ratings for the experimental demand stimuli.
The demand group consisted of all participants within
the debiasing group in the previous threat ratings
analysis.

However, since the experimental demand stimuli

were not presented during the treatment phase of the study
(Figure 1), the dependent variable in the current analysis
was a measure of the changes in probability ratings due to
experimental cues.

Stated simply, the new dependent

variable, mean demand probability ratings, created one
treatment group in which experimental demand was present
and one treatment group in which the demand was absent.
This was achieved because the participants in the demand
group completed the debiasing procedure, but they did not
generate positive alternatives 5or the six game-related
experimental demand stimuli.

Therefore, the demand group

participants were presented with the experimental cues
inherent within the debiasing procedure, but they did not
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generate positive alternatives for the six experimental
demand stimuli.
Conversely, the participants in the no demand, group
did not complete the debiasing procedure and therefore they
were not presented the experimental cues inherent within
the procedure itself.

However, the design of the

statistical analysis was the same in comparison to the
analysis of the previous threat-related stimuli, writh the
exception of the different dependent variable.
For the demand ratings analysis, it was again
hypothesized that highly anxious participants will report
higher probability estimates of future game-related loss
relative to participants with a "normal" level of anxiety
responsiveness.

This finding was expected to be found with

a main effect for anxiety.

In addition, it was again

hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and
anxiety upon demand probability ratings would be found.
This interaction was expected to result in highly anxious
female participants reporting the highest pessimistic
probability ratings in comparison to all male participants
and female participants with a lower level of anxiety
responsiveness.

Finally, it was hypothesized that there

would be no main effects or interaction effects involving
the repeated measure and the experimental demand
independent variable.
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The main effect for anxiety was again expected because
of previous studies that have found increased pessimistic
predictions of future negative events associated with
higher levels of anxiety responsiveness

(Bentz &

Williamson,

In addition, the

1998; Bentz et a l ., 1999).

two-way interaction of gender and anxiety upon demand
probability ratings was expected because of previous
investigations that have found highly anxious female
participants with the greatest pessimistic ratings of
future events
1999) .

(Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al.,

Finally, null finding for experimental demand was

expected because demand characteristics have not been found
to result in a reduction of judgmental errors
Adair,

(Sharpe &

1993) .

Debriefing Ratings Analysis

A third analysis was

conducted using the debriefing questions

(Appendix G) to

group the study participants into categories of subjects
with different perceptions of the purpose of the study.
This final analysis used the same dependent variable as in
the second analysis, mean experimental demand ratings,
except the study participants were grouped according to
their perceptions of the purpose of the experiment.

Two

separate analyses, using the first and third debriefing
questions to group the participants, were conducted.

The

debriefing ratings analysis can be viewed as two secondary
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statistical procedures conducted to verify any effects due
to demand characteristics that were found in the demand
ratings analysis.
However, before any regrouping of participants was
completed, it was important to justify the collapsing of
participants across treatment groups.

Specifically, it was

important to establish that an approximately equal number
of participants from the control and debiasing treatment
groups responded to each of the four alternative responses
of the first debriefing question.

This was important

because it was possible that a majority of participants
from the control or debiasing groups responded to just one
of the alternative responses.

In other words, it was

possible that the participants from the control or
debiasing groups all had the same perception as to the
purpose of the experiment.

If this was true, then

regrouping of participants for the debriefing analysis
would be inconsequential because the majority of
participants would fall into only one of the four groups of
perceived purpose of the experiment.

Any statistical

analysis using a grouping of participants according to this
pattern of response would have misleading findings because
a majority if the variability would fall into only one
group.
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As a result, a 2 X 4 chi-square analysis was conducted
to test the proportion of participants from the control and
debiasing groups who responded to each of the

four

alternative responses of the first debriefing

question.

an approximately equal number of participants

endorsed each

response, then the collapsing of participants

across

If

treatment group and regrouping according to the
participant's responses to the debriefing question could be
justified.
Once the regrouping was justified, participants were
grouped into four categories of subjects using the
responses from the first debriefing question.
Specifically, the four groups included participants who
perceived the purpose of the experiment to (1) increase
their probability ratings,
ratings,

(2) decrease their probability

(3) make no changes in their probability ratings,

and (4) those who did not know the purpose of the
experiment.
The subgroups were used i n a 4 X 2 X 2 X 2

(Four

Perceived Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance.

The

independent variables for the analysis included (1) the
four groups of participants categorized according to their
perceptions of the purpose of the experiment,
pre versus post demand probability ratings,

(2) the mean

(3) the high
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versus "normal" levels of anxiety responsiveness, and (4)
the male versus female participants.

The dependent

variable for the repeated measures ANOVA was the same mean
demand probability ratings used in the second analysis.
It was hypothesized that highly anxious participants
would report higher probability estimates of future gamerelated loss relative to participants with a "normal" level
of anxiety responsiveness.

This finding was expected to be

found with a main effect for anxiety.

In addition, it was

hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and
anxiety upon demand probability ratings will be found.
This interaction was expected to result in highly anxious
female participants showing the highest probability ratings
in comparison to all male participants and female
participants with a "normal" level of anxiety
responsiveness. Finally, it was hypothesized that there
would be no main effects or interaction effects involving
the repeated measure and the four demand groups.

A null

finding for this analysis was expected because demand
characteristics have not been found to result in a
reduction of judgmental errors

(Sharpe & Adair,

1993).

Lastly, using the responses from the third debriefing
question, participants were grouped into two categories of
subjects.

Specifically, the two groups included (1)

participants who noticed a procedure within the experiment
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which suggested the purpose of the experiment was to change
their probability ratings, and (2) participants who did not
notice such a procedure.
The groups were used i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2

(Perceived

Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X Gender)
repeated measures analysis of variance.

The independent

variables for the analysis included (1) the two groups of
participants categorized according to their perceptions of
the purpose of the experiment,
demand probability ratings,

(2) the mean pre versus post

(3) the high versus "normal"

levels of anxiety responsiveness, and (4) the male versus
female participants.

The dependent variable for the

repeated measures ANOVA was the same mean demand
probability ratings used in the second analysis.
Again, it was hypothesized that highly anxious
participants would report higher probability estimates of
future game-related loss relative to participants with a
"normal" level of anxiety responsiveness.

This finding was

expected to be found with a main effect for anxiety.

In

addition, it was again hypothesized that a two-way
interaction of gender and anxiety upon demand probability
ratings would be found.

This interaction was expected to

result in highly anxious female participants showing the
highest probability ratings in comparison to all male
participants and female participants with a "normal" level
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of anxiety responsiveness.

Finally, it was hypothesized

that there would be no main effects or interaction effects
involving the repeated measure and the two demand groups.
A null finding for this analysis was expected because
demand characteristics have not been found to result in a
reduction of judgmental errors

(Sharpe & Adair, 1993).
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Results
Threat Ratings Results
Probability ratings for each of the ten threat-related
situations

(Appendix A and Appendix B) were scored by

recording the value of the participant'’s rating on the
number lines.

The responses from the five positively

worded questions were reverse scored to obtain the
pessimistic ratings for all five items.

Then, all ten

threat-related ratings were averaged to yield a mean threat
probability rating for each participant's pre and post
testing.

These data were utilized as the repeated measure

dependent variable in the statistical analysis
investigating the threat ratings.
A mixed factorial 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures
analysis of variance

(Pre versus Post-Testing X Control

versus Debiasing Treatment X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X
Male versus Female Gender) was conducted to test for
differences in the four independent variables.

In addition

to testing for main effects of each independent variable,
the repeated measures ANOVA allowed the testing of all
interaction effects among the independent variables.

It

was hypothesized that the analysis would find a main effect
for anxiety, a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety,
and finally a two-way interaction of treatment group and
repeated measure.
84
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Significant main effects were found for three of the
four independent variables.

As hypothesized, a main effect

for anxiety group was found (£[1,124] = 13.35, p. < .001).
The average threat probability rating for the highly
anxious group

(mean = 4 9.79%,

= 13.20) was found to be

significantly greater than the "normal" group
42.41%, ££ = 14.58)

(mean =

indicating higher threat-related

likelihood ratings from the highly anxious participants.
Second, a significant main effect for gender was found
(£[1,124] =

47.00, p. < .001).

The average threat

probability

rating for female participants

(mean = 53.03%,

SD = 13.07) was found to be significantly higher than male
participants

(mean = 39.18%, £LL> = 11.65) .

Finally, a

significant main effect for the treatment group was found
(£[1,124] =

12.70, p < .001).

The average threat

probability

rating for the control group (mean = 4 9.70%, ££)

= 14.38) was found to be significantly greater than the
debiasing group

(mean = 42.50%,

= 13.07).

The main

effect for the repeated measure was found to be
nonsignificant

(£{1,124] = 0.58, p. = N S ) .

All possible interaction effects between the four
independent variables were tested in the repeated measures
ANOVA.

As hypothesized, a significant interaction of

treatment group and repeated measure upon threat
probability ratings was found (£[1,124] = 22.88, p < .001).
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The average threat probability ratings for each of the four
groups involved in the two-way interaction were as follows;
Pre-testing Control group

(mean = 49.09%, ££ = 14.05),

Post-testing Control group (mean = 52.48%, £1) = 16.07),
Pre-testing Debiasing group (mean = 45.13%, ££) = 13.8 6),
and Post-testing Debiasing group (mean = 40.29%,
14.28).

=

The.interaction of treatment group and repeated

measure is illustrated in Figure 2.

The repeated measure

independent variable is presented on the X-axis of Figure 2
while the two treatment groups are presented by the
separate bars.

The dependent variable is presented on the

Y-axis.
A post-hoc analysis of the simple effects was
conducted to determine the exact results within the
interaction.

A total of four t-tests were conducted which

were Bonferroni corrected to control for the increase in
Type I error.

Thus, the result of this correction was an

alpha of 0.0125 which was used as the level of significance
for the four t-tests.

Two independent samples t-tests were

conducted to examine the control versus debiasing group
ratings for both the pre and post-testing.

In addition,

two paired samples t-tests were conducted to examine the
pre versus post-testing ratings for both the control and
debiasing groups.

The paired samples t-tests were required
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because the repeated measure pre and post-testing ratings
violated the assumption of independence of samples.
The difference between the control versus debiasing
group ratings of the pre-testing was found to be
nonsignificant

(£.[130] = -1.63, p. = NS) .

Average threat

probability ratings for the treatment groups were initially
found to be equivalent.

However, at post-testing the

control versus debiasing group ratings differed
significantly (£[130] = 4.58, p < .001).

The paired

samples analysis revealed that the debiasing group ratings
significantly decreased (£[61] = -3.67, p < .001) and the
control group ratings significantly increased (£[69] =
3.08, p < .005) from pre to post-testing.
All other interaction effects between the independent
variables within the repeated measures ANOVA were tested
and found to be nonsignificant.

The test results for each

of the nonsignificant interaction effects were as follows;
Anxiety Group X Gender

(£[1,124] = 0.34, p = NS), Anxiety

Group X Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 0.05, p = NS), Anxiety
Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.85, p = NS), Gender
X Repeated Measure
Treatment Group

(£[1,124] = 2.42, p = NS), Gender X

(£[1,124] = 0.44, p = NS), Anxiety Group X

Gender X Treatment Group (£[1,124] = 0.74, p = NS), Anxiety
Group X Gender X Repeated Measure

(£[1,124] = 0.23, p =

N S), Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure
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(£[1,124] = 0-06,
Repeated Measure

e

= NS), Gender X Treatment Group X

(£[1,124] = 1.01, p. = NS), Anxiety Group X

Gender X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure

(£[1,124] =

0.83, p = N S ) .
Demand Ratings Results
The second set of data was collected to investigate
the possibility that any systematic change in probability
ratings was simply due to demand characteristic factors.

A

set of game-related situations was developed to evaluate
the ratings of several non-threatening situations.
Specifically, the data collected from the six experimental
demand stimuli

(Appendix E and Appendix F) were used as a

separate dependent variable.

Probability ratings from each

of the six game-related situations were scored and averaged
in a similar fashion to the experimental stimuli.

Positive

questions were reverse scored then all six ratings were
summed and averaged to yield a mean experimental demand
probability rating for each participant's pre and post
testing ratings.

These data were then utilized as the

repeated measure dependent variable in the statistical
analysis investigating demand ratings.
A similar 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of
variance (Pre versus Post-Testing X Demand versus No Demand
X High versus "Normal" Anxiety X Male versus Female Gender)
was conducted.

The design was identical to the previous
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threat ratings analysis with the exception of the change in
the dependent variable to the game-related experimental
demand stimuli.
The inclusion of the game-related dependent variable
converted the control versus debiasing treatment
independent variable of the previous threat-related
analysis to the current demand versus no demand independent
variable.

As described earlier, this conversion was an

appropriate control for the measurement of experimental
demand within the treatment procedure because the gamerelated stimuli were not administered to the participants
during the treatment phase of the experiment.

Thus, the

game-related dependent variable measured the change in
probability ratings due to the experimental cues within the
treatment phase of the experiment.

It was hypothesized

that the analysis would find a main effect for anxiety and
a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety.

In addition,

it was hypothesized that there would be no main effect or
interaction effects found involving the repeated measure.
The results indicated that there was a significant
main effect for the repeated measure
.05).

(£[1,124] = 4.22, p. <

The average game-related probability ratings were

found to be significantly higher for the post-testing (mean
= 4 9.60%,

= 12.15)

in comparison to the pre-testing

(mean = 47.74%, ££ = 10.52).

All three other main effects
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were found to be nonsignificant including the main effects
for anxiety group (£[1,124] = 2.83,
(£[1,124] = 0.01,
1.32,

e

e

= NS), gender

e

= NS) , and treatment group (£[1,124] =

= NS).

All possible interaction effects of the four
independent variables were tested and all were found
nonsignificant.

to be

The test results for each of the

nonsignificant interaction effects were as follows; Anxiety
Group X Gender (£[1,124] = 0.18,

= NS), Anxiety Group X

e

Treatment Group

(£[1,124] = 1 . 6 4 , E = NS), Gender X

Treatment Group

(£[1,124] = 1.42,

= NS), Anxiety Group

e

Repeated Measure (£[1,124]

=0.08,

E=

Repeated Measure (£[1,124]

= 0.18,

e

X Repeated Measure

(£[1,124] = 1.76,

X Gender X Treatment Group

X

NS), Gender X

=

NS), Treatment Group

e

= NS), Anxiety Group

(£[1,124] =

Anxiety Group X Gender X Repeated Measure

1.34,

e

= NS),

(£[1,124] = 1.98,

E = NS), Anxiety Group X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure
(£[1,124] = 0.08,

e

= NS), Gender X Treatment Group X

Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 1.60,

e

= NS), Anxiety Group X

Gender X Treatment Group X Repeated Measure
2 .23,

e

(£[1,124] =

= NS) .

Debriefing Ratings Results
Finally, a third statistical analysis was conducted to
again test for effects due to demand characteristics
inherent within the debiasing procedure.

Identically to
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the demand ratings analysis, the data collected from the
six experimental demand stimuli (Appendix E and Appendix F)
were analyzed as the repeated measure dependent variable.
However, two debriefing questions

(Questions Number 1 and

3) were used as grouping variables to categorize
participants according to their perceptions of the purpose
of the study.
These final statistical procedures can be viewed as
two additional analyses to investigate the influence of
demand characteristics upon future probability ratings.
Instead of using the experimental grouping of the treatment
manipulation, the debriefing questions were used to
categorize participants into groups according to their
perceptions of the purpose of the experiment.

Thus, the

analyses of the demand data was completed in order to
examine the participant's game-related probability ratings
as a function of their perception of the purpose of the
study.

This analysis was achieved by collapsing all

participants within the demand and no demand groups, then
separating the participants according to their selfreported perceived purpose of the study (Debriefing
Questions 1 and 3).
However, as described earlier it was important to
justify the separation of participants and verify that
participants responded to the debriefing questions with
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different perceptions of the purpose of the experiment.
This verification was needed because it was possible that a
large portion of participants responded to only one of the
four answers.
A 2 X 4 chi-square analysis was conducted to achieve
this verification.

The proportion of participants from the

demand and no demand groups were compared for each of the
four possible responses to the first debriefing question.
No significant difference in the proportion of participants
was found (chi-square = 0.626, p. = NS).

Thus, an

approximately equal number of participants endorsed each of
the four possible responses of the first debriefing
question.

This finding justifies the collapsing of

participants across treatment group and regrouping
according to their self-reported perception of the purpose
of the study.

The collapsing and regrouping of

participants is justified because, as explained earlier, an
approximately equal number of participants was needed in
each of the four possible groups.

Without this equal

distribution of participants, the debriefing analysis
results could be inconsequential because a majority of the
data variability would fall into only one of the perceived
purpose groups.
- The first analysis used the responses from the first
debriefing question to group participants into four
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categories of subjects.

Specifically, the four groups

included participants who perceived the purpose of the
experiment to (1) increase their probability ratings,
decrease their probability ratings,

(2)

(3) make no changes in

their probability ratings, and (4) those who did not know
the purpose of the experiment.
The groups were used in a 4 X 2 X 2 X 2

(Four

Perceived Demand Groups X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance.

The four

independent variables and all possible interaction effects
were tested for statistical significance in the repeated
measures ANOVA.

As stated earlier, it was hypothesized

that there would be a main effect for anxiety and a two-way
interaction of gender and anxiety.

In addition, it was

hypothesized that there would be no main effect or
interaction effects involving the repeated measure.
The results showed a significant main effect for the
repeated measure (£[1,116] = 5.74, jo < .05).

The average

game-related demand ratings of the post-testing (mean =
4 9.60%, ££. = 12.15) were found to be significantly higher
than the ratings of the pre-testing (mean = 47.7 4%, ££ =
10.52).

The three remaining main effects were all found to

be nonsignificant including the main effect for anxiety
group (£[1,116] = 0.89, £ = NS), gender (£[1,116] = 0.00, p
= NS), and demand group (£[3,116] = 0.53, p. = NS).
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All interaction effects involving the four independent
variables were tested and found to be nonsignificant.

The

test results for each of the nonsignificant interaction
effects were as follows; Anxiety Group X Gender

(£[1,116] =

0.01, p. = NS), Anxiety Group X Demand Group (£[3,116] =
0.70, p = NS), Gender X Demand Group
N S ) , Anxiety Group X Repeated Measure
N S ) , Gender X Repeated Measure
Demand Group X Repeated Measure

(£[3,116] = 0.55, p =
(£[1,116] = 0.62, p =

(£[1,116] = 0.63, p = NS),
(£[3,116] = 0.42, p = NS),

Anxiety Group X Gender X Demand Group

(£[3,116] = 2.06, p =

N S), Anxiety Group X Gender X Repeated Measure
0.54, p = N S ) ,

(£[1,116] =

Anxiety Group X Demand Group X Repeated

Measure (£[3,116] = 1.59, p = NS), Gender X Demand Group X
Repeated Measure (£[3,116] = 0.42, p = NS) , Anxiety Group X
Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[3,116] = 1.14,
p = NS).
Finally, the responses from the third debriefing
question were used in the last repeated measures ANOVA to
group participants into two categories of subjects.
Specifically, the two groups included

(1) participants who

noticed a procedure within the experiment which suggested
the purpose of the experiment was to change their
probability ratings, and (2) participants who did not
notice such a procedure.
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The groups were then used i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2
(Perceived Demand Group X Repeated Measure X Anxiety X
Gender) repeated measures analysis of variance.

The four

independent variables, and all possible interaction effects
were tested for statistical significance.

It was again

hypothesized that there would be a main effect for anxiety
and a two-way interaction of gender and anxiety.

In

addition, it was hypothesized that there would be no main
effect or interaction effects involving the repeated
measure.
All four main effects were found to be nonsignificant
including the main effect for anxiety (£[1,124] = 2.06, p =
NS), gender (£[1,124] = 0.35, p = NS), demand group
(Z[lrl24] = 0.41, p. = NS), and repeated measure
2.99, p = NS) .

(£[1,124] =

However, the repeated measure main effect

approached significance.
All interaction effects involving the four independent
variables were tested and found to be nonsignificant.

The

test results of the nonsignificant interaction effects were
as follows; Anxiety X Gender (£[1,124] = 0.00, p = NS),
Anxiety X Demand Group (£[1,124] = 0.05, p = NS), Gender X
Demand Group (£[1,124] = 1.06, p = NS), Anxiety X Repeated
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.01, p = NS), Gender X Repeated
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.10, p = NS), Demand Group X Repeated
Measure (£[1,124] = 0.24, p = NS), Anxiety X Gender X
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Demand Group (£[1,124] = 0.16, p. = NS), Anxiety X Gender X
Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.47, p = NS), Anxiety X
Demand Group X Repeated Measure

(£[1,124] = 0.59, p = NS),

Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure (£[1,124] = 0.12,
p = NS), Anxiety X Gender X Demand Group X Repeated Measure
(£[1,124] = 1.76, p = N S ) .
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Discussion
It was the goal of the current study to investigate
one debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative
procedure

(Hirt & Markman,

1995), and its ability to reduce

the judgmental errors which have been shown to be
associated with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz &
Williamson,

1998).

In addition, a rival hypothesis of

demand characteristics was examined as a possible
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental
errors.
The findings provide support for several conclusions
involving a judgmental bias associated with anxiety, the
reduction of the judgmental bias, and the role demand
characteristics has in the study of the bias.

First, the

pessimistic judgment of future events associated with
anxiety was replicated (Bentz & Williamson,
al., 1999).
procedure

1998; Bentz et

Second, the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing

(Hirt & Markman, 1995) was shown to be an

effective technique in the reduction of the judgmental
bias.

Finally, experimental demand was shown to be

associated with changes in probability judgments.

However,

demand characteristics could not explain the reduction in
the judgmental errors.
It is important to note for the purpose of the
discussion section that equivalent baseline threat and
98
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game-related ratings were needed.

Equivalent baseline

ratings establishes a ratings level from which changes in
prediction ratings could be demonstrated.

Thus, for the

purpose of experimental control, it was desirable that the
groups did not differ at baseline.

The results showed that

baseline ratings were equivalent for both the threat and
game-related ratings.

Therefore, it can be concluded that

the initial, pre-testing, levels of threat and game-related
probability ratings were equivalent, allowing the
subsequent analysis of changes due to the treatment
procedure.
Threat Ratines Discussion
In review, the results of the statistical analysis on
the threat ratings indicated three significant main effects
for anxiety group, gender, and treatment group.

In

addition, the analysis found one two-way interaction of
treatment group and repeated measure.

It was hypothesized

that there would be a main effect for anxiety group, a twoway interaction of gender and anxiety, and a second two-way
interaction of treatment group and repeated measure.
First, it was found that highly anxious participants
rated the likelihood of future negative events more
pessimistically than participants with a "normal" level of
anxiety responsivity.

As hypothesized, a high level of

anxiety was found to be associated with higher ratings of
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future threat.

This result is consistent with several

previous studies that have found greater pessimistic
predictions of future negative events associated with
higher levels of anxiety (Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz
et al., 1999; Butler & Mathews,
1996).

1983; MacLeod & Byrne,

In addition, it supports the conclusion that higher

levels of anxiety are associated with biased judgments of
the likelihood of future threat.
Second, it was found that female participants rated
the likelihood of future negative events more
pessimistically than male participants.

It was

hypothesized that a two-way interaction of gender and
anxiety upon threat probability ratings would be found due
to similar findings in two previous studies
Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999).

(Bentz &

However, no such

interaction was found in the current study.
The previous interaction results of Bentz and
Williamson (1998) and Bentz et al.

(1999) indicated that

highly anxious women predict the likelihood of future
threatening events as more probable than male participants
and female participants with lower levels of anxiety.

The

current results indicated that all female participants,
regardless of level of anxiety, rated the likelihood of
future threat as more probable than male participants.
Thus, the change in findings across these studies was due
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to an increase in pessimistic probability -ratings among
female participants with a lower level of -anxiety in
comparison to male participants.
This change in results could be explained by
methodological differences between the stu<iies.
Specifically, the two previous studies

(Bexntz & Williamson,

1998; Bentz et al., 1999) that found a gender by anxiety
interaction utilized a multiple regression
design.

experimental

In addition, the independent variable, level of

anxiety, included a wide range of anxiety zresponsivity,
i.e. extreme levels of high and low trait anxiety.
found that as anxiety level increased, the

It was

difference

between the probability ratings of male ancd female
participants also increased.

Thus, it is ILikely that the

regression design of the two previous studdes found an
interaction of gender and anxiety because t h e male and
female participants with extremely low levels of anxiety
showed no prediction differences.

Furthermore,

participants who scored more moderately on

the measure of

anxiety made threat probability ratings th a t showed
increasing difference between the genders

(Bentz &

Williamson, 1998; Bentz et a l ., 1999).
In the current study, the anxious comparison group was
designed to be of a more moderate or "normal" level of
anxiety responsivity.

Thus, the anxiety comparison group
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Included male and female group members who were above the
extremely low level of trait anxiety used in the previous
two studies.

It is possible that this methodological

difference resulted in the main effect for anxiety due to
the sufficient gender difference in probability ratings
among the "normal" anxiety group.
This result is not in direct opposition to the
findings of Bentz and Williamson
(1999).

(1998) and Bentz et al.

However, it does suggest that the previous

interaction results were primarily due to the inclusion of
extremely low trait anxious participants in the two
studies.

Thus, it is likely that gender remains a

moderating variable in the association between anxiety and
a judgmental cognitive bias.

Therefore, as suggested by

Bentz et a l . (1999), it is recommended that gender be
included in future studies investigating this association,
particularly when the study sample includes participants
with extremely low levels of anxiety responsivity.
Third, it was found that participants within the
control group rated the likelihood of future negative
events as more likely than participants within the
debiasing group.

The average threat probability ratings of

the control group were significantly higher than the
average ratings of the debiasing group.

However, as

illustrated in Figure 2 the difference between the
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debiasing and control groups is primarily accounted for by
the post-testing ratings.

Thus, an explanation of the main

effect for treatment group must be accomplished with the
following discussion of the two-way interaction involving
the treatment group and repeated measure independent
variables.
Finally, a significant two-way interaction of
treatment group and repeated measure upon threat
probability ratings was found.

As illustrated in Figure 2,

the threat ratings of the control group showed a positive
trend with increasing likelihood ratings from pre to post
testing.

Furthermore, the threat ratings of the debiasing

group showed a negative trend with decreasing likelihood
ratings from pre to post testing.
Post-hoc analysis of the simple effects within the
two-way interaction confirmed these trends.

The control

group threat probability ratings significantly increased
from the pre to the post-testing.

The debiasing group

threat probability ratings were significantly reduced from
the pre to the post-testing.

In addition, the pre-testing

ratings were equivalent for both the control and debiasing
groups confirming equal baseline ratings for the threatrelated analysis.

Finally, the post-testing ratings of the

control group were significantly higher than the debiasing
group.

It is concluded that these findings are generally
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supportive of the effectiveness of the Consider-AnAlternative debiasing procedure

(Hirt & Markman, 1995) in

the reduction of judgmental errors.
The main evidence in support of this conclusion is the
decrease in threat probability ratings of the debiasing
group from pre to post testing.

The Consider-An-

Alternative debiasing procedure decreased participant
ratings of the likelihood of future threatening events as
was expected.

The control group did not show a similar

decrease in likelihood ratings, leading to the conclusion
that the reduction in ratings was due to the treatment
procedure.
In addition, the finding of a reduction in threatrelated probability ratings in the debiasing treatment
group was equivalent across anxiety level.

This finding

suggests that the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing
procedure was effective in the reduction of judgmental
errors regardless of the level of anxiety.

Therefore, the

debiasing procedure may be applicable to the reduction of
judgmental errors in prediction situations for not only
highly anxious individuals but also individuals that have a
more moderate level of anxiety responsivity.
An increase in threat probability ratings of the
control group was also found and requires further
discussion.

The control group was presented a procedure
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during the treatment phase of the experiment that consisted
of reading the same stimuli and recording the nouns and
verbs found within each paragraph.

This procedure was

conducted in order to control for effects due to
habituation.

It is possible that participants within the

control group actually read each paragraph more than once
during their recording of the parts of speech.

This

repetition of the negative situations then would have
resulted in further activation of threat information,
ultimately leading to increased probability estimates.
This explanation of the increased probability ratings
in the control group due to the repetition of the stimuli
is supported by the previous research of Weinstein and
Klien

(1995).

As described earlier, the authors

investigated four debiasing procedures in an attempt to
reduce health risk judgments.

All procedures were

unsuccessful in reducing the judgmental bias and, more
importantly, the two procedures that forced participants to
focus on the health risks actually resulted in an
exaggerated bias.

Thus, Weinstein and Klien

(1995) showed

that the repetition of the health risks information
increased judgment errors.

In the same way, it is possible

that the control group in the current study may have
increased the threat probability estimates due to the
repetition of the negative stimuli.

This explanation is
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speculative since there was no way to measure the number of
times each participant read each scenario.
In summary, several important findings from the threat
ratings analysis were made.

First, the findings offer

additional evidence that level of anxiety responsivity is
associated with the biased judgment of future negative
events

(Bentz & Williamson, 1998; Bentz et al., 1999;

Butler & Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996).

Second,

female participants were found to have more pessimistic
future predictions than male participants.

Although an

interaction of gender and anxiety was hypothesized, it is
likely that methodological differences between the studies
can account for this change in results.
Third, it was found that participants within the
control group rated the likelihood of future negative
events as more likely than participants within the
debiasing group.

However, this main effect for treatment

group is primarily accounted for by the two-way interaction
of treatment group and repeated measure upon threat
probability ratings.

Close examination of the interaction

effect showed that, as hypothesized, a decrease in
probability ratings from pre to post testing was found for
the debiasing group.

This finding is supportive of the

effectiveness of the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing
procedure

(Hirt & Markman, 1995) in the reduction of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

judgmental errors.

In addition, it was found that the

highly anxious and "normal" groups responded equivalently
to the debiasing intervention.

Finally, the two-way

interaction also showed an increase in threat probability
ratings of the control group which may be attributable to
repetition of the negative stimuli resulting in the
exaggerated judgmental bias.
Demand and Debriefing Ratings Discussion
In review, the statistical analyses involving the
game-related demand stimuli and the debriefing questions
included three separate procedures that grouped
participants according to their perceptions of the purpose
of the study.

In the first and the second procedures, a

main effect was found for the repeated measure.

The game-

related post-testing probability ratings of the
participants were found to be significantly higher than the
pre-testing ratings.

All other main effects and

interaction effects in the three analyses were found to be
nonsignificant.
It was hypothesized that the three statistical
procedures would each find a main effect for anxiety, an
interaction of gender and anxiety, and no main effects or
interaction effects involving the repeated measure.

It was

the objective of the three analyses to investigate demand
characteristics as a rival hypothesis to any finding of the
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reduction in judgmental errors associated with the
debiasing procedure.
The two findings of a main effect for the repeated
measure confirms that experimental demand was associated
with increased probability ratings from the pre to the
post-testing.

As will be discussed later, this finding

supports the conclusion that experimental cues within the
informed consent or instructions led to the increase in
probability ratings, not the experimental cues within the
debiasing procedure.
The three analyses failed to find a main effect for
anxiety.

Stated simply, there was no significant

difference found between highly anxious and "normal"
participants on the game-related likelihood ratings.

It

was hypothesized that there would be found a main effect
for anxiety because previous studies have demonstrated an
association between anxiety and a prediction bias
Williamson,

(Bentz &

1998; Bentz et a l ., 1999).

One possible explanation for this

failure to find a

main effectfor anxiety is that the study participants
have viewed

may

the game-related-events as situations that had

random outcomes or situations in which they had very little
control over the outcome.

As a result, the study

participants, regardless of their level of anxiety, may
have made their ratings around 50% and reduced the
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variability of the game-related ratings, a central tendency
response bias.

If the study participants perceived the

game situations in this way, then it would have been
possible that no difference in game-related probability
ratings would have been found between the anxiety groups.
Close examination of the pre and post ratings of both
the threat-related and the game-related ratings showed an
overall pattern that supports this conclusion.

In general,

the average game-related ratings were closer to 50% and
showed lower variability than the threat-related ratings
suggesting that there may have been a central tendency
response bias.

However, the fact that two main effects

were found involving the repeated measure suggests that
decreased variability of the dependent variable was not the
cause of this null finding.
In hindsight, it would have been helpful to include a
third phase to the pilot study to verify the game-related
stimuli as an adequate measure for the comparison of demand
characteristics.

For example, a small experiment could

have been conducted using undergraduate students randomly
assigned to a demand group and a no demand group in a
similar repeated measure pre-post experimental design.

The

demand group would have completed the game-related stimuli
as a pre-testing.

Then, the demand group participants

would have received some instructions informing them that
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the purpose of the experiment was to influence them to make
their ratings as low as possible.

The demand group would

then have received the same game-related stimuli again as a
post-testing.
The no demand group would also have completed the
game-related stimuli as a pre-testing.

However, this group

would then have received some distractor task that
approximated the time that it took the demand group to
receive their instructions.

The no demand group would then

have received the game-related stimuli again as a post
testing.

These data would have been analyzed in a 2 X 2

repeated measures ANOVA.
If the game-related stimuli were perceived by all the
participants as events in which they had very little
control, thus leading to a central tendency response bias,
then the analysis would find no main effects or interaction
effects involving the two independent variables.

If, on

the other hand, the game-related stimuli were an adequate
measure of the experimental demand, then the analysis would
find an interaction of the repeated measure and the demand
group.

A pilot study such as this would have clearly

established the game—related stimuli as an adequate measure
to allow the comparison of experimental demand.
A second possible explanation for the failure to find
a main effect for anxiety is the content specificity
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hypothesis.

Specifically, the theory as originally

described by Beck and Emory (1985) proposes that emotional
problems of an individual determine the content of the
information processing errors that are most common for that
individual.

Therefore, since the game-related prediction

stimuli have very little similarity in content to the
threat—related information processing errors associated
with anxiety, a main effect for anxiety would not be found.
Stated simply, it is possible that the highly anxious
participants had no judgmental bias when completing the
game-related predictions because the content of the stimuli
did not activate the error.
Prior research on the content specificity of a
judgmental bias associated with anxiety is sparse.

In the

only study that directly investigated the phenomena, Bentz
et al.

(1999) presented findings that were generally

supportive of the content specificity of judgmental errors
associated with anxiety.

Therefore, it is concluded that

the most likely explanation of the failure to find a main
effect for anxiety in the demand analyses is the content
specificity of the stimuli.
by two reasons.
al.

This conclusion is justified

First, the previous research of Bentz et

(1999) supports the content specificity explanation.

Second, the fact that enough variability within the
experimental demand dependent variable was present to find
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the two main effects for the repeated measure makes a
central tendency response bias explanation unlikely.
Neither of the two debriefing analyses found, as was
hypothesized, an interaction of gender and anxiety upon
game-related likelihood ratings.

Again, the same two

possible explanations for the null findings can be stated.
Specifically, as described earlier the lack of an
interaction of gender and anxiety can possibly be
attributed to either (1) a central tendency response bias
or

(2) the content specificity hypothesis.

However, it is

again suggested that the content specificity explanation is
the most probable.
In summary, two important findings and conclusions
from the demand and debriefing ratings analyses can be
reviewed.

First, it can be concluded that the game-related

ratings were influenced by experimental demand.

However,

it is important to note for the purpose of later discussion
that this association was in the positive direction with an
increase in demand ratings from pre to post-testing.
Second, no main effect for anxiety group or interaction of
gender and anxiety were found.

Two possible explanations

were proposed which included (1) a central tendency
response bias and (2) the content specificity hypothesis.
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General Discussion
It was the goal of the current study to investigate
one debiasing technique, the Consider-An-Alternative
procedure (Hirt & Markman,

1995), and its ability to reduce

the judgmental errors which have been shown to be
associated with higher levels of anxiety (Bentz &
Williamson, 1998).

In addition, a rival hypothesis of

demand characteristics was examined as a possible
explanation of any findings of the reduction of judgmental
errors.
The results of the analyses for the study indicated
several general conclusions.

First, the presence of a

judgmental bias associated with anxiety was found.

This

finding supports previous studies that have shown similar
results

(Bentz & Williamson,

Butler & Mathews,

1998; Bentz et al., 1999;

1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) .

However,

the importance of this initial finding must be emphasized.
The demonstration of the judgmental bias associated
with anxiety was essential to the subsequent interpretation
of all results.

If no bias was found, then the evaluation

of the debiasing treatment and the demand characteristics
rival hypothesis would have been impossible.

Stated

simply, if there was no bias then there would be nothing to
debias.

Fortunately, the bias was found supporting

previous studies, and allowing the evaluation of the
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debiasing procedure and the demand characteristics rival
hypothesis.
Second, the debiasing of the judgmental errors
associated with anxiety was demonstrated.

A reduction in

threat-related probability ratings of the treatment group
that received the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing
procedure was shown.

It was concluded that this reduction

in ratings was due to the treatment procedure, namely the
generation of positive alternative outcomes.

Furthermore,

the reduction in threat ratings was equivalent for highly
anxious and "normal" participants.

Finally, the reduction

of threat ratings in the debiasing group corresponded with
an opposite trend for the control group, an increase in
threat-related probability ratings.

As described earlier,

it is possible that this increase in probability ratings
was due to the repetition of stimuli in the control
procedure.
Thus, taken together the effectiveness o'f the
debiasing procedure appeared to result in two possibly
important developments.

First, it is possible that when

individuals are confronted with threatening situations that
require predictions, the process of considering positive
alternative outcomes may lead to more positive thinking.
Second, the same prediction situation may also lead to less
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negative and/or less ruminative thinking and prevent an
exaggeration of judgmental errors.
The primary focus of the current study was to
demonstrate the debiasing of judgmental errors.

However,

the specific process by which the debiasing occurred
remains unclear.

In the introduction, an availability

heuristic explanation was presented in which the activation
of alternative information led to decreased threat
probability ratings.

This explanation continues to be

advocated as the most likely interpretation of the data.
In addition, this explanation is supported by the similar
proposals of Hirt and Markman (1995) and of Muirana and
Wilson (1995).
Finally, an availability heuristic explanation fits
well with the increase in threat probability ratings
observed in the control group.

Specifically, the

repetition of the stimuli may have increased the
accessibility of threat information, ultimately leading to
increased probability estimates in the control group.
Thus, if availability is in fact the driving mechanism of
debiasing, then the findings suggest that the Consider-AnAlternative technique may not only reduce judgmental errors
but also may prevent exaggerated errors that would occur
with the increased accessibility of information.
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It is acknowledged that the exact mechanisms by which
the debiasing may occur remains to be determined.

For

example, one possible alternative explanation of the
debiasing effect pertains to the participants' level of
motivation.

Specifically, the Consider-An-Alternative task

may have increased the motivation of participants by
maintaining a search for alternatives, a search that was
not required of the control group participants.

The result

then may have been lower judgments on the part of the
debiasing group due to increased effort as opposed to
accessibility of information.
A second possible alternative explanation of the
debiasing effect is demand characteristics.

Specifically,

it could be argued that, due to the obvious nature of the
task, experimental cues within the informed consent,
instructions, and debiasing procedure resulted in the
participants reducing their ratings to comply with the
perceived purpose of the study.

This rival hypothesis was

directly addressed with the addition of the six gamerelated experimental demand stimuli and the debriefing
questions.
Experimental demand was found to be associated with an
increase in probability ratings from pre to post-testing.
This increase in ratings was found across all participants,
regardless of treatment group, gender, or anxiety level.
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Thus, it is likely that the experimental cues within the
informed consent and instructions lead to the increase in
probability ratings, not the experimental cues within the
debiasing procedure.

This conclusion can be made because

no difference in game-related probability ratings was
observed between the two treatment groups (control and
debiasing).
As a result, demand characteristics cannot account for
the reduction in threat-related probability ratings of the
debiasing group.

The finding of an interaction of

treatment group and repeated measure upon threat-related
predictions led to the conclusion that the debiasing
procedure was effective in the reduction of judgmental
errors.

It was proposed that this debiasing effect was

likely due to an availability mechanism. Demand
characteristics as a rival hypothesis to this proposal has
been effectively ruled out.
However, demand characteristics were shown to be
associated with an increase in likelihood ratings.
Experimental demand, therefore, continues to be a possible
confound in future research especially when a similar
methodology is employed.

It is recommended that future

experiments pay particular attention to experimental demand
within the informed consent, experimental instructions, and
stimuli to minimize the cues to the study's purpose.
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Thus, anxiety was found to be associated with the
biased judgment of future threatening events.

Women were

found to make higher threat-related predictions in
comparison to men.

The Consider-An-Alternative debiasing

procedure was found to be an effective technique in the
reduction of the judgment bias, regardless of level of
anxiety.

Finally, the reduction in judgmental errors

cannot be explained by demand characteristics.
The findings from the current study have their largest
potential impact in the area of techniques of cognitive—
behavior therapy.

Future research should extend this

debiasing procedure to clinical populations and
psychotherapy treatment outcome studies.

It is possible

that, given continued research interest and favorable
results, future cognitive-behavioral treatment approaches
for anxiety may include training in the consideration of
alternative outcomes.
This study had certain limitations and the findings
should be interpreted within the context of these
limitations.

First, this study used an analog sample of

undergraduate students which restricts the generalization
of these findings to clinical populations.

Future studies

should investigate the judgmental bias and the debiasing of
judgmental errors associated with clinical levels of
anxiety.

Second, this study used a self-report methodology
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which has also been utilized in several previous studies
(Bentz & Williamson,

1998; Bentz et al., 1999; Butler &

Mathews, 1983; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996).

It is recommended

that future studies use a different method of measurement
of the judgmental bias.

For example, the measurement of

actual behavior, such as avoidance, after likelihood
judgments are made by the participants.

Third, the

participants of this study were not followed over time to
investigate if the reduction in judgmental bias was
maintained.

It would be desirable for future studies to

evaluate the reproducibility and stability of the debiasing
effect.
Finally, demand specificity, the possible differential
effects that experimental demand may have on threat versus
game-related ratings, was not examined.

For example,

differential effects that the experimental cues within the
treatment procedure may have had on the threat and gamerelated ratings was not investigated.

It is possible that

the experimental cues caused an increase in probability
ratings on only the game-related ratings while having no
influence on the threat-related ratings.

This differential

specificity of experimental cues to only the demand items
would then have an outcome identical to the present
findings.

However, the results would have been due to the

unique effect that experimental demand had on the game-
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related ratings because of demand specificity.

It is

recommended that future studies employing a similar
methodology clearly establish that differential effects of
experimental demand on judgment ratings has been minimized.
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Appendix A: Pre-Testing Experimental Stimuli

Directions; Please read the following paragraphs and
imagine yourself in that situation.
Then, rate the
probability that the event listed will happen to you on the
following scale, given the situation that you read. You
may use any numeric value between 0% and 100%.
I---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- (---- [
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
90% 100%
0% = The outcome has no chance of occurring.
50% = The outcome has an equal chance of occurring or not
occurring.
100% = The outcome will definitely occur.
Please mark only a line to indicate your rating of the
probability that the event will occur, given the situation
that was presented.
You may draw your line at any point on
the scale provided. DO NOT WRITE A NUMBER

Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to
have it checked.
What is the probability that your car will break down
today?
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1.
It has been raining very hard and windy all day and
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of
water and wind damage in the p a s t .
What is the probability that your home will sustain damage
from the storm?
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2.
You are in a large auditorium with very few other
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people
begin to move toward the exits.
What is the probability that you will be injured trying to
leave the auditorium?
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3.
You are passing one of your classes but it is early in
the semester.
There are several more tests remaining for
your grade to change.
What is the probability that you will fail the class?
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4.
Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is known for a high crime rate.
Your car is
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
What is the probability that you will be mugged?

I---- |---|----|--- |----|--- |----|--- (--- |----|
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5.
It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the
sky.
You live in a home that has never had a history of
water or wind damage from a storm.
What is the probability that your home will avoid damage
from the storm?
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6.
Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is
totally deserted.
One of your tires blows out and you pull
off the road to check for damage.
What is the probability that you will be stranded on the
highway?
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7.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town. This job will
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be
living in an safe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will avoid becoming a
crime victim?
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8.
You have a job that you enjoy but the company is
having financial problems and will lay off several
employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will keep your job?
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9.
You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a
sharp turn is just ahead.
What is the probability that you will avoid wrecking the
bicycle?
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10.
You are driving to a meeting across town, but you
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and traffic
is average.
What is the probability that you will be in a car accident?

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

11.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town. This job will
take you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be
living in an unsafe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will become a crime
victim?
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12.
You have a job that you enjoy and the company is
financially having no problems.
There is little risk that
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will lose your job?
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13.
During the day, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is familiar to you. Your car is parked in an
area that often has others around, but at this time you do
not see anyone.
What is the probability that you will avoid being mugged?
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14.
During the day, you are driving on a highway that has
few other cars.
You know that one of your tires has a slow
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
What is the probability that you will avoid being stranded
on the highway?
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15.
You are failing one of your classes and it is already
half way through the semester.
There are only two tests
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
What is the probability that you will pass the class?

I---- |-- |----|---- ,--- |--- |----,----|----|----|
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16.
You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people
watching a movie.
You have a faint smell of smoke when an
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
What is the probability that you will avoid being injured
trying to leave the auditorium?
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17.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the
engine from starting.
What is the probability that you will be lost at sea?
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18.
You are late for an important meeting across town so
you are driving above the speed limit.
It starts to rain
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
What is the probability that you will avoid a car accident?
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19.
You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road
with no other cars or bicycles in sight.
The brakes of
your bike are working just fine.
What is the probability that you will wreck the bicycle?
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20.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky.
Your
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
What is the probability that you will get home safe?
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Appendix B: Post-Testing Experimental Stimuli

Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and
imagine yourself in that situation.
Then, rate the
probability that the event listed will happen to you on the
following scale, given the situation that you read.
You
may use any numeric value between 0% and 100%.
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0% = The outcome has no chance of occurring.
5 0% = The outcome has an equal chance of occurring or not
occurring.
100% = The outcome will definitely occur.
Please mark only a line to indicate your rating of the
probability that the event will occur, given the situation
that was presented.
You may draw your line at any point on
the scale provided. DO NOT WRXTE A NUMBER

Example; Your car's engine has not been running very well
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to
have it checked.
What is the probability that your car will break down
today?
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1.
You are driving to a meeting across town, but you
don't expect to be late.
The weather is fine and traffic
is average.
What is the probability that you will avoid being in a car
accident?
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2.
You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a
sharp turn is just ahead.
What is the probability that you will wreck the bicycle?
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3.
During the day, you are driving on a highway that has
few other cars.
You know that one of your tires has a slow
air leak, but you cheeked the air pressure in the morning.
What is the probability that you will be stranded on the
highway?
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4.
You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people
watching a movie.
You have a faint smell of smoke when an
alarm goes off and people begin running to the e x it s .
What is the probability that you will be injured trying to
leave the auditorium?

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100%

136

5.
You have a job that you enj oy but the company is
having financial problems and will lay off several
employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will lose your job?
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6.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the
engine from starting.
What is the probability that you will get home safe?
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7.
You have a job that you enjoy and the company is
financially having no problems.
There is little risk, that
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
What is the probability that you will keep your job?
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8.
Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is
totally deserted.
One of your tires blows out and you pull
off the road to check for damage.
What is the probability that you will avoid being stranded
on the highway?

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100%

137

9.
You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of
your bike are working just fine.
What is the probability that you will avoid wrecking the
bicycle?
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10.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
What is the probability that you will be lost at sea?
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11.
You are failing one of your classes and it is already
half way through the semester.
There are only two tests
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
What is the probability that you will fail the class?
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12.
During the day, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is familiar to you.
Your car is parked in an
area that often has others around, but at this time you do
not see anyone.
What is the probability that you will be mugged?
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13.
It has been raining very hard and windy all day and
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of
water and wind damage in the past.
What is the probability that your home will avoid
sustaining damage from the storm?
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14.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town.
This job will
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be
living in an safe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will be a crime victim?
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15.
You are late for an important meeting across town so
you are driving above the speed limit.
It starts to rain
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
What is the probability that you will be in a car accident?
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16.
Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is known for a high crime rate.
Your car is
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
What is the probability that you will avoid being mugged?
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17.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town.
This job will
take you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be
living in an unsafe part of the town.
What is the probability that you will avoid becoming a
crime victim?

I--- |--- ,--- |--- \----|--- !----|--- |--- |----|
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18 . It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the
sky.
You live in a home that has never had a history of
water or wind damage from a storm.
What is the probability that your home will sustain damage
from the storm?
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19.
You are passing one of your classes but it is early in
the semester.
There are several more tests remaining for
your grade to change.
What is the probability that you will pass the class?
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20.
You are in a large auditorium with very few other
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people
begin to move toward the exits.
What is the probability that you will avoid being injured
trying to leave the auditorium?
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Appendix C: Consider-An-Alternative Debiasing Stimuli

Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and
imagine yourself in that situation.
Then, generate three
possible ways in which the situation may end in a POSITIVE
outcome.
Give enough detail to your situational outcome to
clearly explain how the event will end.
Your three
alternative outcomes for the situation should all be
different and POSITIVE in some way.

Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to
have it checked.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

( 3 ) ___________________________________________________________
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1.
You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road
with no other cars or bicycles in sight. The brakes of
your bike are working just fine.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3) __________________________________________________________
2.
It has been raining very hard and windy all day and
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the
news. Your home is built in a low area with a history of
water and wind damage in the past.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3) __________________________________________________________
3.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home. This job will take
you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be living
in an unsafe part of the town.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)

__________________________
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4.
During the day, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is familiar to you.
Your car is parked in an
area that often has others around, but at this time you do
not see anyone.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 ) ______________________________________________________________________
(2 ) _________________________________________________________________________

(3)
5.
You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a
sharp turn is just ahead.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )

(2 )

(3)
6.
You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people
watching a movie. You have a faint smell of smoke when an
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )

(2 )

( 3 ) _____________________________________________________
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7.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky. Your
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)
8.
During the day, you are driving on a highway that has
few other cars.
You know that one of your tires has a slow
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)
9.
Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is
totally deserted. One of your tires blows out and you pull
off the road to check for damage.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)

______
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10. You have a job that you enjoy but the company is
having financial problems and will lay off several
employees in the near future.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)
11. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the
engine from starting.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 ) ______________________________________________________________________
(2 )

(3)
12. You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town.
This job will
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be
living in an safe part of the town.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 ) ______________________________________________________________________
(2 )

(3)
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13.
You are passing one of your
classes but it is early in
the semester.
There are several more tests remaining for
your grade to change.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3) ___________________________________________________________
14.
You are failing one of your
classes and it is already
half way through the semester.
There are only two tests
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )

(2 )

(3) ________________________________________________________
15.
It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the
sky. You live in a home that has never had a_history of
water or wind damage from a storm.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)

_______

______________________________
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16.
Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 ) _______________________________________________________________________
(2 ) ___________________________________________________________________

(3)
17.
You have a job that you enjoy and the company is
financially having no problems.
There is little risk that
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)
18.
You are late for an important meeting across town so
you are driving above the speed limit.
It starts to rain
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )
(2 )

(3)

____________________________________________________
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19.
You are in a large auditorium with very few other
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, people
begin to move toward the exits.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 ) ___________________________________________________________________
(2 )

(3)
20.
You are driving to a meeting across town, but you
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and traffic
is average.
Generate three different POSITIVE ways in which this
situation may end.
(1 )

(2 )

( 3 ) _________________________
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Appendix D: Control Stimuli

Directions: Please read the following paragraphs and
imagine yourself in that situation.
Then, please indicate
the nouns and verbs within the paragraphs by writing the
words in the spaces provided below.
There may be more or
less of the parts of speech present within the paragraphs
in comparison to spaces provided.
However, you need to
only indicate a total of three nouns and verbs in the
spaces provided.

Example: Your car's engine has not been running very well
over the last month and it has been very hard to start at
times, but you have been unable to take it to a mechanic to
have it checked.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)
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1.
You are riding a bicycle on a relatively flat road
with no other cars or bicycles in sight.
The brakes of
your bike are working just fine.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns
(1 )

Verbs
(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)

2.
It has been raining very hard and windy all day and
there has been a flood and tornado advisory reported on the
news.
Your home is built in a low area with a history of
water and wind damage in the past.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)
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3.
You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home.
This job will take
you to a city with a high crime rate and you will be living
in an unsafe part of the town.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.

NQ.uns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) __________________

(2 )

(2 ) ____________________

(3)

(3) _________________

4.
During the day, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is familiar to you.
Your car is parked in an
area that often has others around, but at this time you do
not see anyone.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
NQUns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2)

(2) _

(3)

(3)
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5.
You are riding a bicycle down a large hill when you
realize that the brakes of the bike are not working and a
sharp turn is just ahead.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)

6.
You are in a large auditorium with hundreds of people
watching a movie.
You have a faint smell of smoke when an
alarm goes off and people begin running to the exits.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns
(1 )

verbs
(1 )

(2 )

(2 ]

(3)

(3)
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7.
You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends and it is sunny with few clouds in the sky.
Your
boat has never had any mechanical problems.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verfaa

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2)

(2) _

(3)

(3)

8.
During the day, you are driving on a highway that has
few other cars. You know that one of your tires has a slow
air leak, but you checked the air pressure in the morning.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)
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9.
Late at night, you are driving on a highway that is
totally deserted.
One of your tires blows out and you pull
off the road to check for damage.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

V.sxk£

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)

10. You have a job that you enjoy but the company is
having financial problems and will lay off several
employees in the near future.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)
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11. You are out on the ocean, deep sea fishing with some
friends when a large storm begins to roll in. You try to
start the engine, but mechanical problems prevent the
engine from starting.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns
(1 )

Verbs
(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)

12. You have just graduated from college and taken a job
that will move you away from your home town.
This job will
take you to a city with a low crime rate and you will be
living in an safe part of the town.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)
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13.
You are passing one of your classes but it is early in
the semester.
There are several more tests remaining for
your grade to change.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)

14.
You are failing one of your classes and it is already
half way through the semester.
There are only two tests
remaining to pull your grade up to a passing level.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)
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15.
It has been a sunny day with very few clouds in the
sky.
You live in a home that has never had a history of
water or wind damage from a storm.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)

16.
Late at night, you are walking to your car in a part
of town that is known for a high crime rate. Your car is
parked in an area that has very poor lighting.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns
(1 )

Verbs
(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)
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17. You have a j ob that you enj oy and the company is
financially having no problems.
There is little risk that
the company will lay off any employees in the near future.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)

18. You are late for an important meeting across town so
you are driving above the speed limit.
It starts to rain
heavily and the traffic around you is hard to see clearly.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragraph
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
NO.
UPS

Verbs

(1 )

(1 ) _

(2 )

(2 ) _

(3)

(3)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158

19.
You are in a large auditorium with very few other
people watching a movie. At the end of the movie, peojple
begin to move toward the exits.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragrapch
above by writing the words in the spaces provided below.
Nouns
(1 )

Verbs
(1 )

(2 )

(2 )

(3)

(3)

20. You are driving to a meeting across town, but you
don't expect to be late. The weather is fine and trafffic
is average.
Please indicate the nouns and verbs within the paragrapoh
above by writing the words in the spaces provided belowr.
Nouns
(1 )
(2 )

(3)

Verbs
(1 ) _
(2 )

(3)
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Appendix E : Pre-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli
1.
You are playing on a softball team that is sponsored
by your job.
You have a record of 3 wins and 3 losses, and
today you are playing an opposing team with a similar
record.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
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2.
You are playing a game of volleyball at a summer
picnic with a group of friends.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
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3.
You are playing a game of Monolopy at a holiday party
with your family and friends.
What is the probability that you will win the game?
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4.
You are playing a game of cards at your weekly poker
match with a group of six poker players.
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
,----- |--- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |
0%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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5.
While at the park, you get picked to play some
basketball on an outside court with some people that you do
not know.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?
I --------| ---------| --------| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | ---------|
0% 10%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

6.
You are at a friend's house playing a game of Trivial
Pursuit.
There are a total of six people playing the game,
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
I ------- | -------- | ------- | -------- | -------- , -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- , -------- |
0% 10%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix F: Post-Testing Experimental Demand Stimuli
1.
You are playing on a softball team that is sponsored
by your job. You have a record of 3 wins and 3 losses, and
today you are playing an opposing team with a similar
record.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?
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2.
You are playing a game of volleyball at a summer
picnic with a group of friends.
What is the probability that your team will lose the game?

I-- 1-- ,-- |-- |-- ,-- |-- |-- |-- 1-- 1
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3.
You are playing a game of Monolopy at a holiday party
with your family and friends.
What is the probability that you will lose the game?
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4.
You are playing a game of cards at your weekly poker
match with a group of six poker players.
What is the probability that you will win the game?
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5.
While at the park, you get picked to play some
basketball on an outside court with some people that you do
not know.
What is the probability that your team will win the game?
I---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |
0% 10% 20%
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
6.
You are at a friend's house playing a game of Trivial
Pursuit.
There are a total of six people playing the game,
What is the probability that you will win the game?
I---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- |---- [
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Appendix G: Debriefing Questions

Directions:

1.

2.

Please read the following three questions
and circle the answer that most closely
describes your opinion.

In your opinion, what was the purpose of the
experiment ?
A.

The purpose of the experiment was for me to
increase my probability ratings of the likelihood
of future events.

B.

The purpose of the experiment was for me to
decrease my probability ratings of the likelihood
of future events.

C.

The purpose of the experiment was for me to make
no changes in my probability ratings of the
likelihood of future events.

D.

I don't know the purpose of the experiment.

In your opinion, was there any part of the experiment
that suggested to you that you should change your
outcome probability ratings?
If so, which part of the
experiment gave you this suggestion to change your
probability ratings?
A.

The part which asked me to write several
alternative outcomes to the situations.

B.

The part which asked me to identify the nouns
verbs in the written situations.

C.

The part which asked me to make the outcome
probability ratings for a second time.

D.

There was no part of the experiment that
suggested to me that I should change my outcome
probability ratings.
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3.

Did you notice a procedure within the experiment which
suggested to you that the purpose of the experiment
was to change your probability ratings because you
were considering alternative ways that the situations
may end?
A.

Yes

B.

No
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Appendix H: Informed Consent

1. Study Title:

The Debiasing of Judgmental Errors
Associated with Anxiety

2. Performance Site:

Texas Wesleyan University

3. Investigator:

The following investigator is
available for questions about this
study, M-F, 8:00 am - 5:00 pm.
Bret G. Bentz M.A.,

(817) 732-4231

4 . Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study to
investigate the prediction of
future events and errors that may
occur in these predictions. The
study will investigate several
questions concerning the reduction
of judgmental errors that occur in
differing levels of anxiety.
5. Subject Inclusion:

There are no inclusion or
exclusion criteria for
participation in this study.
All
students recruited through the
Department of Psychology will be
able to participate.

6. Number of Subjects:

400

7. Study Procedures:

The study will include the
completion of several
questionnaires and will take
approximately 45 minutes.
First,
you will be asked to complete a
short demographic information
sheet and a questionnaire designed
to assess you current level of
anxiety.
Next, you will read
several hypothetical situations
and make ratings as to the
probability of certain outcomes.
Next, depending on your randomized
group, you will again read several
similar hypothetical situations
165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166

and either record the parts of
speech in the paragraph or
generate alternative outcomes.
Finally, you will read several
situations and make probability
ratings a second time followed by
several debriefing questions.
8. Benefits:

The benefits for your
participation in this study is the
advancement of the understanding
of judgmental errors associated
with anxiety.

9. Risks:

There are no potential risks for
physical or social harm for your
participation.
Psychological risk
is minimal and only includes the
inadvertent release of sensitive
information found in the second
questionnaire.
Every effort will
be made to maintain the
confidentiality of your study
records. Data will be kept in
secure locations to which only the
investigator has access.

10. Right to Refuse:

Subjects may choose not to
participate or to withdraw from
the study at any time without
penalty or loss of any benefit to
which you are entitled.

11. Privacy:

The results of the study may be
published, but no names or
identifying information will be
included in the publication.
Subject identity will remain
confidential unless disclosure is
required by law.
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12. Signatures:
The study has been discussed with me and all my
questions have been answered.
I may direct additional
questions regarding study specifics to the investigators.
If I have questions about subjects' rights or other
concerns, I can contact Charles E. Graham, Chairman, LSU
Institutional Review Board, (225) 388-1492.
I agree to
participate in the study described above and acknowledge
the researchers' obligation to provide me with a copy of
this consent form.

Participant's Signature

Participant's Name

Date

(Please Print)
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